

## FULANI-HERDERS VIOLENCE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH-EASTERN, NIGERIA

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### ***Abstract***

*This study investigated the effects of pastoral violence on the socio-economic development in South-East Nigeria between 2011 and 2020. Mobility transition theory was adopted to elucidate the migration of pastoralists from place to place across the length and breadth of the Nigeria's South-East, occasioned by socio-economic motives. Mixed method approach, involving quantitative and qualitative data was adopted. A sample size of 500 which represented persons of ages 15-85, was determined using Taro Yamane formula. Research questions were analysed using mean and standard deviation, with a criterion mean value of 2.50. Major findings of the study were that pastoral violence in South-East Nigeria resulted in greater investment apathy, low Foreign Direct Investment, destruction of lives, economic crops and cattle, critical infrastructure and social amenities leading to poor quality of life which are the cardinal points highlighting the negative impacts of Fulani-herders violence on socio-economic development in South-East Nigeria. The study concluded that except there are genuine commitments on the part of the government at all levels and the locals in tackling head-long the lingering pastoralists' violence in South-East Nigeria, current efforts at addressing the problem will remain an illusion in view of the transnational nature of the menace and its negative impacts on the socio-economic development of the zone in the recent past. The study recommended, among others, that the Nigerian government should deploy modern technology for intelligence gathering, demonstrate sincerity and commitment in the use of such information to track the pastoralists and their sponsors in order to deflate their nefarious activities in the South-East in particular and Nigeria in general.*

**Keywords:** *Pastoralism, Violence, Herdsmen, Attacks, Socio-Economic, Development.*

### **Introduction**

The issue of Fulani-herders violence in Nigeria has sparked intense debate, particularly in recent years due to its significant impact on socio-economic development. This study investigates the implications of Fulani-herders violence (FHV) in South-East Nigeria from 2011 to 2020, a period marked by increasing tension between pastoralists and indigenous farming communities. The study is premised on the understanding that sustainable development is intricately tied to

security and stability, which are prerequisites for economic growth and social cohesion. The persistent violence has disrupted critical sectors, including agriculture, infrastructure, health and education, contributing to poverty and resource insecurity.

Between 2015 and 2016, a total of 710 persons were killed by the Fulani herdsmen over ten months in the South-Eastern parts of Nigeria (Mamahet al., 2016; Ezemenaka, 2018). Similarly, 9 persons were reported to have been killed in Nimbo/Ukpabi community in Enugu State by suspected herdsmen and security agencies failed to prevent the attack even when they were forewarned by the community of the imminent attack (Amnesty International, 2018). In March 2016, over 40 persons were killed in Enugu State and over one thousand persons (1000) were displaced. These deaths were attributed to Fulani militia who invaded the community with sophisticated weapons (Mamahet al., 2016).

The above situation was the same in Udi and Ezeagu Local Government Areas of Enugu State, where women were raped and killed by Fulani herdsmen, and a peaceful protest of concerned women folk was led by Eze to the State Assembly, on how women were molested, maimed and raped on daily basis and that unless the government at the state and federal levels rise to the duty of protecting defenseless citizens, the herdsmen will continue to put the women in Igbo land in grave danger, where a member of the traditional ruler's cabinet at Eke community in Udi local government area of Enugu State was killed. The town of Nkpologu community in Uzo-Uwani Local Government of Enugu state in 2015 also witnessed the killing of a young woman on New Year's Eve by Fulani herdsmen in a commuter bus attack. Likewise, there were reported cases of invasion of farmlands and deadly clashes in Ebem and Akanu communities in Ohafia, Omuchieze, Umunneochi, and Uzuakoli in Bende local government area of Abia State between rural farmers and cattle breeders (Olukayode, 2018).

The people of Akokwa community in Ideoto North Local Government Area of Imo State equally suffered a bloody attack by some marauding Fulani herdsmen on the 2nd of February, 2017, same goes for in Uratta community in Owerri North LGA where two persons were killed by Fulani herdsmen while stopping pastoralists from grazing and destroying their farm lands (Muhereza, 2019). The report wasn't different in Anambra where the violent activities of Fulani pastoralists have been through forceful entering of farm lands and destruction of crops from Aniyamelum local government to Akwa North, Ogbaru to Ihiala, Orumba to Anambra East. Apart from destroying farm lands, they kill victims and rape women on daily basis (Muhereza, 2019). Other communities attacked by the Fulani pastoralists include IfiteAnam, Mmiata Anam, UmudezaEbegbu and Iyiora as well as UmuikuAnam, Inom and Onono in Anambra West. Statistics have showed that between 11,500 and 12,000 Christian deaths were recorded resulting from the violent activities of Fulani pastoralists since June 2015 when the present central government came on board. The action of herdsmen's menace in the area has led to astronomical rise in the prices of agricultural produce which is the main source of income for the people. This had left many farmers in pitiable situations as their source of livelihood which is their farm lands has been totally destroyed (Nabai, 2018).

In evaluating the activities of the Fulani-herders activities in the South-East, some burning

concerns begin to agitate the discerning minds. Hence, the emergent questions such as, how has Fulani-herders violence affected the socio-economic development in South-East Nigeria? What containment strategies should be adopted in dealing with the lingering Fulani-herders violence in South-East Nigeria? These questions encapsulate all the major issues of concern that this study sets out to address.

## **Literature Review**

### *Pastoral Violence*

Animal husbandry, the cultivation of livestock, constitutes pastoralism, the practice of livestock production by both sedentary and nomadic populations. Pastoralism is typically characterised by mobility, as livestock are relocated in pursuit of grazing land and water sources. Two essential forms of pastoralism are nomadic and transhumant husbandry of domesticated animals, while the third type, in a broader context, is pastoral farming or enclosed ranching. The emergence of pastoralism was a complex and multidimensional process, with primitive hunting widely regarded as its primary source. Pastoralism is defined as animal husbandry, a sector of agriculture focused on the management, care, and use of grazing cattle on arid or frigid rangelands. Various types of pastoral systems exist, tailored to distinct ecological, political, and economic contexts, with mobility being the defining element of pastoralism (Antonio & Silvia, 2009).

Violence, conversely, occurs when one societal group encroaches upon the area of another, resulting in perceived limits for the latter (Nkwede & Nwobashi, 2010). Violence may denote an act of inflicting psychological, moral, and physical suffering through coercion. Violence manifests in various forms, including marital violence, criminal violence, interpersonal violence, proactive violence (the use or threat of violence to sway results and decisions), and reactive violence (protests against adverse consequences post-event) (Meadow, 2009). Agreeing with Meadow (2009), some scholars opined that the picture painted above suggests that communal conflicts represent a type of violence that needs to be separated analytically from more organised types of ethnic violence (Nkwede, Nwankwo, Aro, & Dauda, 2018). Aggressiveness encompasses various forms, including physical and verbal aggressiveness. Violence constitutes forceful destruction. This definition of violence posits that it entails the application of physical force to injure humans or damage property, which aligns with the majority of existing definitions of violence. Violence is typically associated with the exertion of physical force and the correlation of force (Oyelude, 2019). It may occur among individuals of a distinct group, whether tribal, ethnic, cultural, political, or otherwise. It is typically regarded as a complicated and inescapable aspect of social change, reflecting the diversity of interests, values, and ideas that arise when newly formed entities resulting from social change intersect (Elem, 2019).

The Fulani originated in Senegambia and expanded into around 20 states across West Africa, the Sahel, western Sudan, and the Central African Republic. The population is primarily located in

Nigeria, however some have relocated to urban areas, while others engage in semi-nomadic herding (McGregor, 2017). One reason Fulani pastoralists graze in the arid Sahel regions of West Africa is the environmental circumstances that diminish land availability for agriculture, hence lessening competition between farmers and herders. Due to recurrent droughts in the arid Sahelian regions, the Fulani pastoralists have gradually relocated southward to the Guinea savanna and tropical forest areas, resulting in confrontations over grazing routes with agriculturalists. The population has risen due to farmers relocating northward. In recent years, this industry has been characterised by violent clashes due to frequent transhumance migration, leading to the encroachment of agricultural fields and the indiscriminate destruction of crops by herds of cattle. This has become a significant point of dispute between the herdsmen and the farmers (Iro, 1994).

The origins of the conflicts around access to and use of land resources between farmers and pastoralists are quite complex. Overall, the population increase in northern Nigeria has led to the intrusion of agricultural activities into areas traditionally utilised by cattle herders for livestock rearing. This is particularly apparent in Hausa territory, where traditional pastoral grazing areas (hurumai), stock routes, and water sources have gradually been transformed into agricultural land. Violence and pervasive insecurity in Nigeria have significantly stemmed from disputes between herders and crop producers. In most of these clashes, civilians are often murdered; the loss or destruction of property exacerbates the impoverishment of an already vulnerable people. The frequency and intensity of these inter-communal clashes have become concerning. In Nigeria, the primary causes of conflict between nomadic cattle herders and sedentary farmers are the unlawful encroachment of farms and the damage of crops by cattle, particularly during the planting season and immediately following the harvest period (Blench, 2004).

### *Socio-Economic Development*

The term “development” encompasses various definitions. Development encompasses a diverse array of variables, including economic, social, political, legal and institutional frameworks, as well as various technologies, environmental factors, religion, and the arts and culture. The word economic development denotes an increase in both the quantity and quality of products produced inside a nation, leading to growth and transformation. It involves the transition of the economy to the secondary sector. Economic development denotes a process wherein a nation's real per capita income increases over a specified period (Musaechio & Lazzarini, 2012). The endeavour is to satisfy the expectations and aspirations of the populace, which include fundamental necessities such as food, housing, and clothes. Economic development can be viewed as a deliberate effort to enhance the productive capacity of both the service and manufacturing sectors of the economy (Nwali et al., 2019).

The notion of socio-economic development can be elucidated through the definition of development. It pertains to the societal and economic advancement within a community. The metrics employed to assess socio-economic progress include Gross Domestic Product (GDP), life expectancy, literacy rates, and employment levels. There are also alterations in less tangible

dimensions like as personal dignity, freedom of association, personal safety, freedom from the fear of physical harm, and the degree of engagement in civil society. Socio-economic development may involve procedural or technological advances and modifications implemented by the state in its governing processes. Socio-economic development is an amalgamation of social and economic advancement, as posited by Ijere (2014). In this context, socio-economic development pertains to the enhancement of living standards and the improvement of economic situations for the populace. Ewetan and Urhie (2014) characterised socio-economic development as a consequence of development, defining it as the process of social and economic transformation within a community (p. 45). Socio-economic development, therefore, encompasses the transformations that transpire in the social domain, mostly of an economic kind.

### *Fulani Pastoral Violence and Socio-Economic Development*

An empirical study by McDougal et al. (2015) examined the impact of pastoral violence on Internally Generated Revenues in selected states of Northern Nigeria, including Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau. The findings indicated that states with elevated levels of pastoral violence incurred losses in IGR compared to others. For instance, in 2012, Plateau State was projected to have had a greater decline in its potential IGR compared to other states, correlating with the higher incidence of violence it has faced recently (p.13). Similar reports indicated that Kaduna likewise experienced a significant decline in its Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) due to the protracted violent conflict between farmers and pastoralists. This research implies that IGR creation in states prone to pastoral violence is at a minimal level, hence adversely affecting their socio-economic growth.

Adelakun et al. (2015) determined that farmers in Oyo State suffer significant socio-economic losses due to ongoing Fulani pastoral violence. For instance, farmers have suffered the loss of multiple properties, including a decline in both output and income for crop farmers, attributable to crop destruction by cattle and uncontrolled bush burning (p. 66). They confirmed that farmers experienced greater socio-economic losses than pastoralists in the affected State, noting that “... economic losses, social disturbances, and disruptions to food supply and access characteristic of conflicts could be disastrous, particularly in low-income countries lacking effective social safety nets” (p. 68).

Abugu and Onuba (2015) asserted that “pastoralist violence in specific areas of the Middle Belt and South-East States of Nigeria has resulted in substantial resource losses amounting to millions of naira, thereby exacerbating poverty levels in the impacted regions, particularly concerning the fatalities caused by the ongoing pastoral violence. Their assertion is that pastoral violence has resulted in a depletion of human resources effectively employed in economic activities within the affected regions, thereby diminishing the nation's productive and consumer potential” (p. 49). The palpable sensation of fear pervades the minds of the indigenous population due to the Fulani herders traversing the regions with sophisticated weaponry and ammunition, hence adversely impacting the socio-economic conditions of the community.



Idowu and Okunola (2017) asserted that pastoral violence in Nigeria is comparable to the Biafran War, the ZakiBiam and Odi massacres, Niger Delta violence, and the Modakeke-Ife conflict, significantly impacting peaceful coexistence and the socio-economic development of the nation.

The impact of pastoral violence on Nigeria's overall economy is substantial. The conflict between farmers and herders in Nigeria incurs an annual cost of around US\$14 billion (N5.04 trillion) (Adeyemo, 2018; Nwangwu et al., 2020). The food production capability of Benue State, known as the Food Basket of the Nation, along with other impacted regions, has diminished from 100 percent to below 65 percent. The rationale is that agricultural inputs are seldom accessible due to merchants fleeing, crops in the fields have been devastated, the majority of farmers have absconded, and most of those remaining are individuals whose lives have not been extinguished. The most significant consequence of this is that the economic basis and activities of the populace in Benue State and other examined locations have been severely affected due to the exodus of farmers from their communities in an effort to preserve their lives (Nformi et al., 2014).

The relentless assaults on the agricultural community by Fulani pastoralists in South-East Nigeria have suspended farming operations, hindering farmers and locals from accessing their farmland, harvesting crops, and transporting them to market, resulting in a scarcity of agricultural produce and a rise in prices of the available goods. This scenario aligns with the assertion by Ofuoku and Isife (2010) that, the lethal campaigns and incessant executions of farmers have engendered a detrimental business climate, thus leading to the devastation of perishable agricultural products. They asserted that botanical resources, including crops, livestock, and water, significantly enhance the development, sustenance, and projection of a society's socio-economic power. Furthermore, they contended that a continuous provision of essential amenities, such as healthcare, education, and food assistance in urban areas, fosters the establishment of grazing activities nearby, thereby exerting strain on the finite resources of these regions and jeopardising human livelihoods.

The Individual Education Programme (IEPs) quantifies the economic impact of violence by assessing the direct and indirect costs associated with fatalities, injuries, and property damage resulting from violent incidents. The direct costs consist of expenditures incurred by the victims of violent actions and associated governmental outlays, including medical expenses, while the indirect costs encompass lost productivity and wages, along with the psychological anguish experienced by the victims, their families, and friends. The unit costs of fatalities and injuries are adjusted to account for income disparities among nations, with the costs scaled relative to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of each country in comparison to the original source of the unit costs (McCollister et al., 2010).

## **Theoretical Framework**

The mobility transition theory as propounded by Wilbur Zelinsky in 1971 was adopted in this study. Mobility transition theory is applied to understand pastoral migration patterns across the Sahel, particularly into Nigeria's South-East, driven by socio-economic factors. The major assumption of the theory is that migration is influenced by socio-economic factors. Thus, the theory suggests that migration patterns evolve as societies undergo economic and social changes. As regions experience growth or scarcity in resources, populations move in response to opportunities or constraints. Zelinsky (1971) proposed that migration patterns change according to the stage of development of a society. In agrarian societies, migration is often localised, while in industrial or urbanised societies, it becomes more complex and widespread. Again, as resources become scarce or overused in certain areas, such as through environmental degradation or drought, people or groups (including pastoralists) move to new areas to secure resources. Again, changes in population density, resource availability and economic opportunities create dynamic push-pull factors that affect migration and settlement patterns over time.

Mobility transition theory is highly relevant to the study of Fulani pastoral violence in South-East Nigeria because it explained the migratory patterns of pastoralists who are moving from the arid Sahel region to more fertile areas in the south due to socio-economic and environmental factors. This migration creates conflicts with local farming communities, as the pastoralists encroach on farmland, leading to competition for land and resources. The theory supports the understanding of why the pastoralists are moving, the socio-economic pressures they face, and how these movements impact the socio-economic development and stability of the South-East region. By applying this theory, the study contextualised the root causes of pastoral violence as tied to broader migratory trends influenced by both economic necessity and environmental stress, thereby providing insights into the need for policy interventions focused on resource management, conflict resolution and sustainable development practices.

## **Methodology**

The study adopted mixed method design thereby using both quantitative and qualitative data. The target population for this study was 8,396,829 drawn from three South Eastern States namely Anambra, Ebonyi and Enugu as projected by National Population Commission/National Bureau of Statistics estimate in 2019. Taro Yamane formula was adopted to determine the minimum sample size of 400 participants from the population of three States selected in order to allow for inference on the population. However, additional 100 participants were purposively selected making the larger sample size of this study to be 500 participants in the age bracket of 15-85 years from the accessible population for quantitative analysis. The non-probability sampling technique was adopted to select respondents from the 30 selected affected communities, in 22 Local Government Areas, and 8 Senatorial Districts of Anambra, Ebonyi and Enugu State in proportion to the population of each Local government. 500 subjects were purposively selected Out of which, 395 persons were farmers/locals, and 105 were Fulani pastoralists due to the peculiarity of the targeted respondents of this study.

**Table 1:** Summary of Order of distribution of questionnaire by States, Senatorial Districts  
Local Government Areas Selected Affected Communities and Target Respondents

S/No	State	Senatoria I Districts	Local Govt.	Selected affected communities	Farmers/ Locals	Pastoralists	Total
1	Anambra	2	4	10	85	23	108
2	Ebonyi	3	8	10	149	39	188
3	Enugu	3	10	10	161	43	204
	<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>395</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>500</b>

**Source:** Authors’ Field Work, 2024

The study made use of both primary and secondary data. In gathering data for this work, open-ended questionnaire was used for a pilot study of the area covered by this research via phone calls, WhatsApp messages, video calls and emails. The responses from the pilot study aided in the choice of the communities, local governments and States affected by the activities of pastoralists in the South- East. The primary source of data was a structured self-designed questionnaire titled 'Fulani-Herders Violence and Socio-Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria (FPVSEN)' which was used to collect data from farmers/locals and Fulani pastoralists. The response patterns to the structured questionnaire instrument was designed in line with the four points modified Likert scale. This has a mean value of 2.50 obtained from the grade where 4 stands for (SA) Strongly Agree, 3 for (A) Agree, 2 for (D) Disagree and 1 for (SD) Strongly Disagree. The sum = (4+3+2+1) =10 mean value =10/4=2.50. While the research questions were analysed using descriptive statistics (mean and Standard Deviation) with the criterion mean value of 2.50, the secondary data were analysed using content analysis.


**Data Presentation and Analysis**

**Table 2: Showing Order of Retrieval of Questionnaires**

State	Respondents	Distributed	% Distributed	Retrieved	% Retrieved
Anambra	Farmers/Locals	85	17	81	16.2
	Pastoralists	23	4.6	22	4.4
Ebonyi	Farmers/Locals	149	29.8	141	28.2
	Pastoralists	39	7.8	37	7.4
Enugu	Farmers/Locals	161	32.2	153	30.6
	Pastoralists	43	8.6	41	8.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>475</b>	<b>95</b>

**Source:** Authors’ Field Work, 2024






**Fig. 1: Distribution of the instruments and return rate**

**Source:** Authors' Field Work, 2024

**Table 3: Demographic data of the respondents**

	Category	N	%
<b>Gender</b>	Male	361	76.00
	Female	114	24.00
<b>Occupation</b>	Farming	378	79.58
	Pastoralist	97	20.42
<b>Age Bracket</b>	15-24 years	96	20.21
	25-34 years	128	26.95
	35-44 years	153	32.21
	45 years & above	98	20.63
<b>Religion</b>	Christianity	302	63.58
	Islam	173	36.42
	Others (Specify)	0	0.00
<b>Qualification</b>	No schooling	67	14.11
	Primary School	161	33.89
	Secondary school	237	49.89
	Tertiary	10	2.11

**Source:** Authors' Field Work, 2024



**Source:** Authors’ Field Work, 2024


Table 3 above showed the demographical data of the respondents. Based on gender, the males were 76.0% while the females were 24.0%. Based on the participants' occupation, 79.58% of the total participants were farmers, while 20.42% were pastoralists. Based on the age brackets, the participants between 15-24 years represented 20.21%; those within the age bracket of 25-34 years were 26.95%; those between 35-44 years represented 32.21%, while those within the age bracket of 45 years and above were represented 20.63% of the participants. Based on religion, participants who are Christians were 302 in number representing 63.58% of the total participants; those who are Muslims were 173 representing 36.42%; while there are no participants who are devotee to other religion. Based on educational qualification, the participants with no schooling were 67 (14.11%) participants; those who attended Primary school were 161 (33.89%); participants who attended Secondary school were 237 (49.89%); while participants who had tertiary education were 10 (2.11%) participants.

**Research Question 1:** How has Fulani-herders violence affected the socio-economic development in South-East, Nigeria?

**Table 4 :** Summary of descriptive statistics on the mean ratings of Fulani-herders violence which affected the socio-economic development in South-East, Nigeria

S/N	Items	SA	A	D	SD	Mean	SD	Decision
1	The farmers/locals in the South -East live in fear and panic due to incessant attack by Fulani pastoralists	128	184	86	77	2.76	1.02	*
2	Funds meant for development of health care, education, agriculture and infrastructure are diverted to tackle the menace of Fulani pastoralists in South-East.	75	101	254	45	2.43	0.87	
3	Fulani pastoralists violence result to loss of cattle, crops, arable farmland and ancestral homes which impose new economic/social pressure on the people of South-East.	74	104	251	46	2.43	0.87	
4	South-East Nigeria is experiencing economic instability by the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons via of Fulani pastoralists to other non-state actors	197	145	131	2	3.13	0.83	*
5	Farmers/locals are unable to access farmland which has led to loss of economic crops, hunger and poverty.	57	197	126	95	2.45	0.94	
6	The violent activities of pastoralist have prevented investment and access to credit facilities by farmers and other entrepreneurs.	156	131	94	94	2.73	1.12	*
7	The violence result to destruction of social amenities schools, hospitals, markets and other infrastructure in the South- East.	55	248	67	105	2.53	0.96	*
8	There are reported cases of abduction, rape of women and girls that result to severe psychological trauma.	107	158	176	34	2.71	0.89	*
9	Fulani pastoralists' attacks are well calculated and organised for forceful takeover of farmlands and de -facto territorial expansion to gain economic control.	83	241	117	34	2.79	0.81	*
<b>Grand mean</b>						<b>2.72</b>	<b>0.37</b>	<b>*</b>

Key\* Agree



**Fig. 3: Mean ratings on Fulani pastoral violence which affected the socio-economic development in SouthEast**

**Source:** Authors’ Field Work, 2024


The result in table 4 above showed the descriptive statistics on Fulani-herders violence which affected the socio-economic development in South-East Nigeria. The grand mean on Fulani pastoral violence which affected the socio-economic development in South-East, Nigeria was found to be  $2.72 \pm 0.37$ . The result agreed that South-East Nigeria is experiencing economic instability by the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the hands of Fulani pastoralists and other non-state actors with the mean  $3.13 \pm 0.83$ . The result also indicated that the attacks by Fulani pastoralists are well calculated and organised for forceful takeover of farmlands and de-facto territorial expansion to gain economic control with the mean  $2.79 \pm 0.37$ . The result as well revealed that the farmers/locals in the South-East live in fear and panic due to incessant attack by Fulani pastoralists with the mean  $2.76 \pm 1.02$ . The result further agreed that the violent activities of Fulani pastoralist have prevented private investment and access to credit facilities by farmers and other entrepreneurs with the mean  $2.73 \pm 1.12$ . The result also agreed that there are reported cases of abduction, rape of women and girls that result to severe psychological trauma with the mean  $2.71 \pm 0.89$ . The result finally indicated that Fulani pastoralists violence resulted to destruction of social amenities schools, hospitals, markets and other infrastructure in the South- East with the mean  $2.53 \pm 0.96$ .

**Research Question 2:** What containment strategies should be adopted in dealing with the lingering Fulani-herders violence in South-East, Nigeria?

**Table 5:** Summary of the descriptive statistics on the containment strategies adopted in dealing with the lingering Fulani-herders violence in South-East Nigeria

S/N	ITEMS	SA	A	D	SD	Mean	SD	Decision
10	Security should be removed from the exclusive list and decentralised to various tiers of government for shared responsibilities and community policing should be encouraged and established in South-East.	156	200	103	16	3.04	0.82	*
11	Fulani pastoralists and other person(s) who wield Ak47 and other weapons in South-East should be arrested and prosecuted.	75	153	139	108	2.41	1.01	
12	There should be synergy between the Federal, state, Local governments and host communities on policies to reduce the activities of Fulani pastoralists.	142	178	76	79	2.81	1.04	*
13	Pastoralism as private enterprise, should be carried out through ranching as practised in other climes.	84	103	243	45	2.48	0.89	
14	There should be functional immigration policy with strict border control to reduce the influx of foreign pastoralists and their activities in South East Nigeria.	82	105	243	45	2.47	0.89	
15	There should be deployment of modern technology in crime fighting like drones, target killing for combating 21st century crime and criminality.	207	143	125	0	3.17	0.82	*
16	The effective monitoring and implementation of the ECOWAS transhumance protocol to reduce migration of illegal immigrants and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons should be carry out.	75	185	123	92	2.51	0.98	*
17	The Nigerian Land Use Act, open grazing and other extant laws on land ownership and grazing routes should be reviewed.	164	131	88	92	2.77	1.12	*
18	Nigerian government should proscribe Fulani pastoralists as a terrorist group to make their activities illegitimate in consonants with the Global Terrorism Index as was done to IPOB.	70	234	64	107	2.56	1.00	*

19	The farmers and locals whose farm land and crops were destroyed as well as pastoralists whose herds were killed should be compensated by the state government in collaboration with the federal government to enable them pick up their lives and livelihood	163	189	107	16	3.05	0.84	*
20	Gainful collaboration between Nigerian government and international organisations in the fight against terrorism will reduce the menace of Fulani pastoralists	64	174	134	103	2.42	0.97	
21	Government should collaborate with well-meaning leaders in the South-East and NGOs to end the pastoral violence in the affected states.	144	181	76	74	2.83	1.03	*
22	The Nigerian government should borrow a leave from UAE and tackle the menace of desertification in the north to reduce the south wards drifts of pastoralists in search of grazing	89	106	238	42	2.51	0.90	*
<b>Grand mean</b>						<b>2.69</b>	<b>0.32</b>	<b>*</b>

**Key\* Agree**

**Fig. 4: Mean ratings on containment strategies adopted in dealing with the lingering Fulani-herders violence in South-East, Nigeria**



The result in table 5 showed the descriptive statistics on the containment strategies in dealing with the lingering Fulani-herders violence in South-East Nigeria. The grand mean on the strategies to reduce Fulani-herders violence in South-East Nigeria was found to be  $2.69 \pm 0.32$ . The result agreed that there should be deployment of modern technology in crime fighting like drones, target killing for combating 21st century crime and criminality with the mean  $3.17 \pm 0.82$ . The result further agreed that farmers and locals whose farm land and crops were destroyed as well as pastoralists whose herds were killed should be compensated by the state government in collaboration with the federal government to enable them pick up their lives and livelihood with the mean  $3.05 \pm 0.84$ . The result also agreed that security should be removed from the exclusive list and decentralised to various tiers of government for shared responsibilities and community policing should be encouraged and established in South-East with the mean  $3.04 \pm 0.82$ . The result further agreed that government should collaborate with well-meaning leaders in the South-East and NGOs to end the pastoral violence in the affected states with the mean  $2.83 \pm 1.03$ . The result also agreed that there should be synergy between the Federal, state, Local governments and host communities on policies to reduce the activities of Fulani pastoralists with the mean  $2.81 \pm 1.04$ . The result as well agreed that the Nigerian Land Use Act, open grazing and other extant laws on land ownership and grazing routes should be reviewed with the mean  $2.77 \pm 1.12$ . The result also agreed that Nigerian government should proscribe Fulani pastoralists as a terrorist group to make their activities illegitimate in consonance with the Global Terrorism Index as was done to Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) with the mean  $2.56 \pm 1.00$ . The result as well agreed that effective monitoring and implementation of the ECOWAS transhumance protocol to reduce migration of illegal immigrants and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons should be carry out with the mean  $2.51 \pm 0.98$ . The result finally agreed that Nigerian government should borrow a leaf from UAE and tackle the menace of desertification in the north to reduce the south wards drifts of pastoralists in search of grazing with the mean  $2.51 \pm 0.90$ .

## **Discussion of Findings**

### **Effects of Fulani-Herders (FHV) on the Socio-Economic Development (SED) of South-East Nigeria (SEN)**

In table 4 the items of the questionnaire with the mean values between 3.13 -2.53 were indicated as very cardinal factors. However, 3 other items of questionnaire with mean value of 2.45 - 2.43 were not that critical, but had significant effects. This finding therefore indicated that most of the respondents agree that FHV has had a devastating impact on SED of SEN at the grand mean value of 2.72 with SD of 0.37. These findings are concurrent with the ideas of McDougal et al. (2015), Adelakun et al. (2015), Abugu and Onuha (2015), Johnson and Okunola (2017) and Nwangwu et al. (2020). As an example, McDougal et al. (2015) opined that states with PV lost more internally generated revenue (IGR) than others, that in 2012, Plateau State is predicted to have lost a larger portion of its hypothetical IGR than the other states, and that this is in line with the fact that Plateau has experienced a larger amount of violence than the other states over the past few years (p.13). Similarly, Nkwede (2018) argued that it is the activities of the core-nomads

and the semi-nomads that constitute the problem in rural communities due to the fact that they own sophisticated weapons and to that extent, they terrorise the rural communities especially the rural farmers and their crops in Nigeria. This implies that the IGR production in such pastoral violence-prone States has been at the lowest ebb thus having an overall adverse impact on their socio-economic growth. In the same way, Adelakun et al. (2015) have reported that the socio-economic losses incurred by the farmers are to a large extent due to Fulani pastoral violence. They also claimed that farmers incurred more socio-economic losses than the pastoralists in the concerned State and this implies that "... economic losses, social disturbance and the disruptions to food supply and access that accompany conflicts can be catastrophic, particularly in low-income countries where no effective social safety nets exist (p. 68)."

This is also the case of Abugu and Onuba (2015) who acknowledged that the violence of the pastoralists in certain regions of the Middle Belt and the South-East States of Nigeria led to massive loss of resources in millions of naira and therefore, high level of poverty in the regions when viewed in the context of the number of people killed by the protracted pastoral violence. It is arguably true that pastoral violence has led to loss of human resource that is gainfully employed in economic activities of the regions they inhabit, hence, diminishing the productive and consumerist capacity of the country (p. 49). The effects of the pastoral violence on the general economy of Nigeria are overwhelming to the extent that the federal government claimed that Nigeria lost approximately US\$14 billion (N5.04 trillion) per year to the farmers herders conflict in the country (Adeyemo, 2018; Nwangwu et al., 2020).

### **Containment Strategies in dealing with the lingering Fulani-Herders Violence (FHV) in South-Eastern Nigeria (SEN)**

The strategies of commanding reduction of FHV in SEN on table 4 are between 3.17 and 2.51 mean value. The 4 other items that have a mean value of 2.48-2.41 does not however render them irrelevant. Based on the above, most of the respondents concurred that the use of the proposed containment strategies in the management of lingering FHV in SEN could be the game changer with grand mean value of 2.69 SD 0.32. These results are in line with those of Johnson and Okunola (2017), Leonhardt (2019), Adelakun et al. (2015), Folk (2015), Ejiogu (2019) who expounded on the identified interconnections between the military sector, political/government, economic, societal and environmental sectors as the major dynamics of successful security architectures. Also, Johnson and Okunola (2017) provided some recommendations that include, among others, to review and adopt National Livestock Development policy, effective adoption of Community Policing Model, grazing reserves, national stakeholders conference on nomadic pastoralism and appreciation of the roles of traditional institutional rulers in the grundnorm of the country. According to Leonhardt (2019), the ECOWAS Protocol of 1998 does not ensure peaceful coexistence among the Member States, therefore, there is a need to completely revise the Protocol.

When indicating the measures to be taken to deal with the long-lasting pastoral violence in Nigeria, Adelakun et al. (2015) mentioned that government has already offered a number of grazing areas and routes, as well as demarcated a number of hectares of land to be used as grazing and created centres of veterinary services and settlements of nomads. Ejiogu (2019) proposed the establishment of volunteer initiatives, such as community policing programs, the formulation of standards and criteria for evaluating community-oriented terrorism monitoring units, and the concept of interconnected communities to create a comprehensive and inclusive intelligence community policing framework in areas besieged by pastoralists. Folk (2015) posited that targeted killing, as a principal counter-terrorism strategy, has a positive effect on decreasing fatalities resulting from suicide bombings.

## **Conclusion**

The findings underscored that Fulani-herders violence has severely impacted socio-economic development in South-East, Nigeria. Persistent attacks have disrupted farming activities, deterred investment, and limited access to essential services, creating a precarious environment for residents. These disruptions have affected income generation, food security and overall quality of life, with an observed increase in poverty and social instability. Containment strategies identified include deploying modern technology for intelligence gathering, implementing strict border control to manage transnational migration, and decentralising security to empower community policing. Additionally, policies like revising the Land Use Act, adopting ranching, and establishing compensation schemes for affected farmers and pastoralists were highlighted as critical to restoring stability. Addressing the pastoral violence crisis requires sustained governmental commitment and effective collaboration across local, state and federal levels to secure a path to peace and development for South-East, Nigeria.

## **Recommendations**

This study made the following recommendations based on its findings:

- i. The Nigerian government should deploy modern technology for intelligence gathering, demonstrate sincerity and commitment in the use of such information to track the pastoralists and their sponsors in order to deflate their nefarious activities in Nigeria and most especially the South-East.
- ii. To address the effects of pastoral violence on the socio-economic development in the South-East, with the view that the importance of peace and security for sustained socio-economic development cannot be over-emphasised in any contemporary society, therefore the Nigerian government should adopt a programme after the model of Niger Delta Amnesty for militants to provide a platform for mopping up of illegal arms from the non-state actors like the Fulani pastoralists and also reorientation for them.
- iii. In addition, the Nigerian Land Use Act and other extant laws on land acquisition /ownership

and grazing routes should be reviewed. Thus, the heightened state of fear of insecurity will be doused and also create enabling environment that will attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), local investments, aid farmers to access their farmlands and locals to engage in their normal business and other socio-economic activities in Nigeria and South-East in particular.

- iv. On containment strategies in dealing with the lingering pastoral violence, security should be devolved from the exclusive list to make it share responsibility of all tiers of government where community policing can be adopted. In the same vein, adequate compensation and loans should be paid by the federal and regional government to farmers/locals and Fulani pastoralists whose farmlands, crops, properties and herds were destroyed to enable them get back their livelihood, also the need for the enactment and enforcement of no-open grazing laws, proscribe Fulani pastoralists as a terrorists organisation in consonance with the Global terrorism index (2015), ensure that ranching is adopted in the face of population explosion and pressure on available natural resources in line with global best practices.

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