

GOVERNANCE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: EXPLORING FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH EAST STATES

Chibuikwe E Madubuegwu

Governance and Development Studies Unit, Institute for Peace, Security and
Development Studies, IPSDS, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Anambra State

totlechi@gmail.com

<https://orcid.org/0009-0005-7990-9384>

Abstract

Governance, security and development are concepts of correlational imperatives in the context of state. This study therefore explored fundamentals of constituency representation in bolstering governance accountability amid systemic crises of security and development in South-East States of the Federation. The qualitative methodology of this paper lent credence to desk review of data. Data were collected through documentaries (in text books, articles, reports) and non-participant observation (acting as role observer in 30 electoral wards on the ratio of 6 wards per state in the south-east region within period of 42 weeks as significant events were recorded occasioned with local news reports) which were textually analyzed in theoretical orientation of structural-functionalism. The study revealed a region of 25 million people under constituency representation of 1,246 electoral wards across 95 local government areas in a landmass of 29,428 square kilometers. The study further discovered that 10.85 million people across five states in Eastern Nigeria which represents 45.21 percent of its population are grappling with challenges of multidimensional poverty which arguably indicated a dysfunctional gap between intentions, plights and expectations. From these findings, the discourse advocate for review of Local Government Administration Laws to strengthen rural legislative governance, institutional reform among other fundamentals such as Councilor-Community Policing Initiative (CCPI) framework for a region that will be secured and developing in constituency representation of impact.

Keywords: *Constituency Representation, Development, Legislative Governance, Security.*

Introduction

Representative democracy across time and space is the bedrock of legislative governance. The democratic imperatives of every legislative assembly resonate with functional indulgence in anxieties, interests and expectations of the people. Thus, the *functional indulgence* is contextualized as *representation* which invariably constituted the hallmark of modern democratic governance. And, the substance of representation in its models and dimensions is

weighed and scaled in the extent public plights and expectations are mainstreamed in legislation and policies of the government for action and impact. To this end, representation is Geodelineated in *constituencies* for purpose of legislative governance and administration of policies to improve social welfare. In other words, the value of constituency is beyond electoral politics to remain fundamental in security and development of the constituents through representation.

Observably, African largest democracy, Nigeria in spite of its symbolic state legislative institutions (National Assembly, State Assemblies and Local Councils) is grappling with crises of governance to secure and develop the country. In credence, Ukwu and Mamah (2024) remarked that Nigeria has continue to witness unprecedented security challenges in escalating political threats (chaos and partisan killings) at the levels of federal, state, and local government occasioned with restiveness of ethno-religious chauvinism, Fulani Herdsmen menace, banditry, abductions for ransom, ritual killings and separatist agitation (Uzoh, 2025, Maina e tal, 2023, Gbolahan 2023). Consequently, Ukwu and Mamah (2024) and Okonkwo (2015) shared the view that security challenges continue to endanger lives and properties, disrupt business operations, scare farmers away from farmlands, and deters both local and foreign investment, and undermine development by creating crises of poverty, unemployment (Mukhtar, 2022). To this extent, economy in growth and development is adversely affected.

In assessing Nigerian economy in measurable indicators, Adesina (2025) stressed that Nigeria's GDP per capita is extremely low (\$1,596) putting the nation in the bottom rung of African countries, compared to Ghana (\$2,260), Cote d'Ivoire (\$2,530), Namibia (\$4,168), South Africa (\$6,022), Egypt (\$3,457), Morocco (\$3,771) and Botswana (\$7,820). In other words, Nigeria's economic growth is anemic to further indicate that the country is retrogressing. Beside Adesina's assertion, the inflation indices are frightening in food and agricultural commodities which correlate with security challenges in Fulani herders-farmers clashes. Furthermore, Report of Federal Republic of Nigeria (2025) document that in May 2025, food inflation on a Year-on-Year basis was highest in Borno (64.36%), Bayelsa (39.85%), Taraba (38.58%), while Katsina (6.90%), Rivers (9.18%), and Kwara (11.31%) recorded the slowest rise in food inflation on Year-on-Year basis. On a Month-on-Month basis, however, May 2025 Food inflation was highest in Bayelsa (12.68%), Cross River (11.15%), and Anambra (9.10%) while Katsina (-5.42%), Jigawa (-4.02%) and Kaduna (-3.27%), recorded decline in food inflation on Month-on-Month basis. Recently, in October 8, 2025, World Bank Country Director (Nigeria), Maltheu Verghis revealed that 139 million Nigerians are currently living in poverty. The revelation was made on the occasion of launch of its October 2025 Nigeria Development Updates in a report titled, *"From Policy to People: Bringing the Reforms Gains Home"*.

As indicated in the Report of Federal Republic of Nigeria (2025) Anambra in the eastern region was one of the states in the federation with high food inflation which invariably elicit the need for more insight into development challenges of other states in the South East. In a broad perspective, Udenna-Okoppor (2024), Ezeilo (2021) and Okafor (2019) stressed that the challenges of southeast development is chronicled in unprecedented rise in insecurity, youth unemployment, brain drain of skilled professionals, infrastructural deficits, uncontrolled urbanization, poor service from public institutions occasioned with governance and policy gaps.

Finding affinity, Okolie et al (2022) observed that the escalated security challenges in Nigeria's southeast has continue to disrupt governance programmes and militate against development.

These adverse realities as observed and documented undoubtedly elicit pertinent questions on governance structure and process. *What could be the issues? And how will these issues be plausibly handled?*

These questions therefore evinced the import of the *research problem* as this study intends to explore the viability of constituency representation at the level of rural governance as a response to crises of security and development in the southeast region. Perhaps, *what could be issues, fundamentals and plausibility* that accentuate the pertinence of constituency representation in rural governance to mitigate intractable security and development challenges in the eastern region of Nigerian federation? For purpose of thematic dissection in causal analysis, the discourse is divided in this introduction, conceptual discourse, theoretical discourse, south east states in dysfunctional trend of security and development crises, fundamentals of constituency representation in rural governance for secured and developing south east states in Nigeria and, conclusion and recommendations.

Conceptual Discourse

Governance

Emphatically, modern definition and interpretation of governance as concept and social reality are beyond the contextual imperatives of the authoritative organs of government. Hence, the pervasiveness in the concept of governance is evinced in its multidisciplinary elucidations in clusters of its contexts and functionality. In this vein, Madubuegwu and Madukwe (2022) remarked that governance is also defined from perspectives of context, structure and process. As related to '*context perspective*', governance may be classified as state governance, rural governance, corporate governance and global governance defining its environmental significance in pursuit of its respective goals and targets. As related to '*structure perspective*', governance varies in legal framework, cluster of institutional responsibilities and organizational context. For instance, there are disparities in structures between state governance, corporate governance and global governance. The third perspective is '*process of governance*' which essentially showed peculiarities of decision-making processes as defined by laws and precedents across contexts and structures. To add, Stoker (1998) opined that governance refers to "development" of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred. The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government...*it's an interaction of a multiplicity of governing and each other influencing actors*. In other words, to conceptualize governance is invariably attempt to offer varied scholarly perspectives in what may appear as generic indicators of *governance interpretation* as Madubuegwu (2024) posited that the following five fundamentals are instructive in the conceptualization of governance:

- (a. Its context is broad and classified.
- (b. It is a process of impact.
- (c. It is purposeful and utilitarian.
- (d. It is a practice that function within structures, legal frameworks and networks of responsibilities and,
- (e. Its drive ought to be guided by a model.

In the context of *public governance* which this study intends to enunciate, governance is subtly defined as process of articulation of public expectations which reflect in legislation and policies for impact and feedback. Hence, governance in formal structures of state government begins with contact and interactions where anxieties and opinions are articulated and mainstreamed in frameworks of laws and public policies for impact. Remarkably soothing and instructive in this contextual definition of state governance perspective is *contact and interaction* which accentuate the imperatives of *representation and constituency*. And, the “assembly” which facilitates the correlational functionality of representation and constituency is the *legislature*. From this indication, Madubuegwu and Nkwede (2016) defined legislature as output and most democratic structure of the political system entrusted primarily with the roles of law-making, representation and oversight functions. The *most democratic* in Madubuegwu and Nkwede's definition is visibly seen in *legislator-constituents'* relations as interests and expectations conventionally inform motive and action of legislative behavior. Hence, the political reality of legislative governance finds currency and relevance in legislative assembly and process. Thus, legislative governance is therefore viewed as a process of legislation in public expectations for national security and development. And, this process begins with *constituency representation*.

Representation and Constituency Representation

Representation is more appropriately conceptualized as *political representation* which is a basic concept in legislative studies. To illuminate the polemics in the definition of political representation, Asimiyu and Adebola (2019) opined that the different conceptualizations of political representation are informed in different interpretations of the relationship between the representative and constituents, as well as the functions of an elected representative. Beside the relational perspective in conceptualizing what is representation or more appropriately political representation, Heywood (2007) reminiscent that the issue of representation has over the centuries and decades generated deep and recurrent political controversy beginning from the era of absolute Monarchs who were expected to rule by seeking advice of the *estates of the realm* (the major landed interests, the clergy) to the period of the English Civil War of the seventeenth century when war between Kings and Parliament broke out as a result of an attempt to deny representation to key groups and interests. In a modern time, it was observed that debate about the spread of democracy otherwise known as representation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries revolved around the following questions.... *who should be represented? Should representation be restricted to those who have the competence? or should representation be*

extended to all adult citizens? These questions have now largely been resolved through widespread acceptance of *political equality*, at least in the formal sense of *universal suffrage* and “*one person*” “*one vote*”.

To conceptualize, political representation is defined by where citizens live (Rehfeld, 2005). This definition implied that in nation-states where there is democratic government (efficient or deficient) citizens are represented through residency at level of ward, state and regional or territorial seen in representative democracies across the world. However, Rehfeld's definition is limited in the nature of contact and manner of relations with the citizens and representatives on issues of public/individual interests and legislative indulgence. To this end, the contents of representation in its value and scale are not illuminated in Rehfeld's definition. Succinctly, Johari (2005) defined representation as the process through which attitudes, preferences, view points, and desires of the entire citizenry or a part of them are with their expressed approval are shaped into governmental action on their behalf by a smaller number among them binding effect upon those represented. Johari's apparently embellished the underlying variables of representation as an institutional obligation to strengthen accountability in governance.

These definitions of political representation in its significance and variants underscored the fact that citizens or people are represented. And, people are represented from a constituency otherwise known as an *electoral district*. Hence, electoral district is defined as delineated Geo-unit area of voters represented in the parliament. The democratic imperatives of every constituency are visibly seen in electoral politics and representation. Again, constituency also appeared in two broad membership-structure of representation (Single-Member Constituency and Multi-Member Constituency). In this vein, Mahajan (2003) indicated that the territory of a country is usually divided into as many constituencies as there are seats to be filled up and one member is returned from the constituency. In a single-member constituency system, each voter has one vote to give in electing a candidate from competing candidates to serve as a representative. In multi-member constituency system, many members of the parliament are elected from the same constituency and each voter has as many votes as there are seats to be filled.

Beyond the membership-type of representation (single or multi), constituency representation is a process of identifying with plights and opinions of a constituency for legislative action. It further implied that constituency representation not only enable the legislator to indulge in unpleasant situation but explore way or measures of its mitigation, and articulate and convey opinions and interests of the constituents for legislative action. Constituency representation therefore enhances practice of responsiveness and accountability in governance which constituted the hallmarks of a democratic government.

Interestingly, political scientists in legislative studies have advanced views over the decades to explore plausible measures that reinforce constituents' interests in legislative governance. In this regard, Mezey (2011) articulated the following questions to underline the import of these scholarly opinions:

- a. *What is the nature of the relationship between representatives and constituents—that is,*

what are the responsibilities of the representatives are to those whom they represent?

- b. *If the representative determines that the objective interests of the constituency conflict with constituency opinion on an issue, which should take precedence – what the representative believes to be in the interests of the constituents, or what the constituents believe to be in their interests?*
- c. *When it comes to making policy decisions, to what extent is the representative obligated to do as his constituents wish, even it means ignoring his own judgment?*
- d. *Should the representative act in the best interest of his constituency or in the best interest of his country as a whole, if these two interests conflict?*
- e. *How can the representative know with any degree of precision what the opinions of constituents are, especially on complex policy matters?*
- f. *Does the representative's responsibility to his constituents extend beyond the consideration of their views and interests on policy questions? For example, are representatives responsible for providing assistance to individual constituents who are experiencing problems with government institutions, or for lobbying their colleagues or members of the executive on behalf of local constituency interests?*
- g. *How do political parties affect the relationship between representatives and their constituents?*
- h. *How does the manner in which representatives are nominated and elected influence the way that they view their responsibilities toward their constituents?*

These questions have long occupied the attention of political scientists in *legislative research* as well as political practitioners in *legislative practice*, and observers (academic and casual) of legislative behavior, however, answers to these questions are often contradictory (Mezey, 2011). Although, these questions are inexhaustible but offered insights to empirical-logical views which later advanced into theories and models of representation.

Four models of representation as embellished by scholars illuminate. The first is the trusteeship model of representation found in Edmund Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol in 1774: *It implied that the essence of representation was to serve one's constituents by the exercise of 'mature judgment' and 'enlightened conscience'. Representation is a 'moral duty'; those with the good fortune to possess education and understanding should act in the interest of those of who are less fortunate.* Hence, rational voters should support politicians who would act wisely on their behalf rather than ones who merely reflected the voters' views (Heywood, 2007). On the contrary, Mezey (2011) observed that democrats rejected the *trusteeship model of representation* arguing that the concept of *popular sovereignty* requires the representative to do as his constituents wish, regardless of his own policy preferences or judgment. For instance, citizens regularly complain that representatives do not respond to the will of the people as *representatives do what is popular rather than what is necessary*. In other words, the critique of trustee model of representation leads to another model of representation, *the delegate*.

The delegate model of representation expected the representatives to convey the views of others while having little or no capacity to exercise his or her own judgment or preferences. The advocacy on mechanism of representation ensures that politicians or representatives are bound as closely as possible to the views of the represented, frequent interchange, and serving to check self-serving limitations of professional politicians (Heywood, 2007). On the contrary, Mezey (2011) argued that **although** the delegate view of the representative's responsibilities appears to be more congruent with the notion of popular sovereignty than the trustee view however there are numerous problems depleting its practice. For instance, a representative who represents hundreds of thousands of constituents, the opinions of these citizens on each issue that comes before the legislature may not be clear or even ascertainable especially when the issue is a complex matter. Also, it is likely that many constituents will have no opinion on many issues and that many others will have opinions that are ill informed, especially when it comes to more complex public policies or to those policy decisions that have no direct effect on the lives of the constituents.

Beyond the inclinations of the lawmaker and constituents in representation, scholars also observed the influence of party affiliation in constituency representation referred as *the mandate*. In this vein, the *mandate model of representation* argued that political parties serve as viable platforms for candidacy and election of representatives not necessarily on personal qualities and talents. The party therefore serves as agency of representation to justify party unity and discipline. In effect, politicians or representatives serve their constituents not by thinking themselves or acting as channel to convey their views but by remaining loyal to the party and policies (Heywood, 2007). In credence, it is also observed that strong political parties are those that determine which candidates get to run for office under the party label and take primary responsibility for organizing and funding legislative elections. In most countries with *proportional representation* system, a large number of voters maintain strong allegiances to a political party and are inclined to vote for the party's candidate regardless of the personal qualities of the candidate. Representatives in such systems are likely to view themselves as obligated to support the platform of their political parties and, when it comes to voting in the legislature, the decisions of their party leaders takes preeminence (Wilson, 2017). The fidelity of the representative to the party is fervent in anticipation of re-nomination, mobilization and logistics for re-election to more dividends of government by the party platform. However, genuine concerns of the constituents which does not align with party policy and interests are neglected in legislative processes. Invariably, the limitations of mandate model of representation created realignment of interests and alliances among the constituents to demand for exclusivity in representation otherwise known as *resemblance model*.

The resemblance model of representation implied that only people who come from a particular group, and have shared the experiences of that group can fully identify with its interests. The model portrays representation in exclusive or narrow terms believing that only a member of the working class can represent the working class (Heywood, 2007). In this vein, resemblance model of representation protect and advance minority interests and affiliations in constituency where largely varied groups compete for recognition. On the contrary, the resemblance model of

representation segregate constituency interests which may undermine genuine concerns of popular interests.

Furthermore, there are models of representation from the perspective of *institutional orientation, composition and drive of the legislature* as advanced over the decades by political science scholars in legislative studies. In this regard, Johari (2005) summarized these models in reactionary theory of representation, elite theory of representation, conservative theory of representation, liberal theory of representation and radical theory of representation. The reactionary model posited a parliament that legislate in popular interest and earn public support in government policies as elite model acknowledged a legislative assembly of *distinguished persons* in knowledge and competencies to always act in the *best interest* of the public. On the other hand, conservative model is an extension of elite model of representation where members of the parliament are chosen from the elite group by the people. However, the elite-lawmakers act from their discretion to legislate in public interest and development. Also, liberal model (is in affinity with delegate model) where the parliament is seen as an assembly of representatives that act as *messenger* for the constituents rather than a policy-maker while radical theory holds that members of the parliament are chosen from the people and only the *people themselves can represent own views on important issues of public concerns*.

Emphatically, what is underlining and instructive in models and practice of constituency representation is extent of indulgence to identify, articulate and express seen as *responsiveness*. In other words, the criticality of responsiveness in representation cannot be ignored in modern legislative-constituency studies and practice which was acknowledged decades ago as Lowenberg and Kim (1978) revealed the importance of responsiveness in representation. Thus, parliamentary responsiveness or responsiveness of a lawmaker or a parliamentarian begins with depth understanding of the constituents, use of various channels of communication through which to listen and hear, and the propensity to consider and answer the demands of the constituents. From this indication, Eulau and Karpis (1977) underscored three critical components (policy, service and allocation) in representation. First is policy responsiveness where *target actualization or attainment* is publicly cherished and acknowledged. On the other hand, service responsiveness which entailed *particularized benefits* for individuals and groups in the constituency where allocation responsiveness refers to lawmaker's efforts to obtain *sharing dividends* for the constituency and re-allocate in equity and fairness for welfare and development of the constituents.

Invariably, the primary responsibility of every government is commitment to safety and social welfare of its citizens and aliens which underscored the importance of law and policy. In other words, social realities of security and development become considerably pertinent to conceptualize.

Security and Development

Security as a concept though is replete with varied definitions but generically implied freedom and safety from fear. In this vein, Owo (2021), Ani (2022), Nwanegbo and Odigbo (2013) shared

affinity of views that security is classified at level of individual, community, state and nation to indicate absence of threats and terror. In a similar perspective, security implied the readiness of the state institutions through laws, policies and instruments of force to secure citizens and investments from danger and threat either internally or externally (Adebayo, 2017; Adesina, 2015, Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). Furthermore, security beyond human security is also security of service and commodities (Mohammed, 2019; Duru, 2014). In the context of this discourse, security of a region is conceptualized under the following indices:

- a. Freedom as people move freely and pursue legitimate social and economic ventures in atmosphere of safety.
- b. Absence of threat and aggression against persons, state infrastructures and investment.
- c. Capacity of the security agencies to detect threat, and act promptly to alert and secure.

When people can't move freely to pursue legitimate social and economic ventures in atmosphere of uncertainties and apprehension then there is absence of security. Also, when there are unprecedented incidents of threats and aggression against persons, state infrastructures and investment in situation where state security agencies have failed then there is what is contextualized as *insecurity*.

Consequently, security challenges undermine development. To this end, the concept of development is polemic in interpretation. In this sense, Gauba (2003) stressed that the concept of development evolved from the sphere of social sciences to guide new nations who won their independence after the second world war (1939-1945). Succinctly, Nwankwo (2025) defined development as a multifaceted concept which encompasses various aspects of human progress and societal advancement. As the operative word is *progress*, it is therefore a process commonly equated with improvements, a complex process of change which results in improved levels of living for the population and the collective betterment of society of mankind. Hence, it has economic, social, political and even environmental dimensions. To add, Madubuegwu, *e tal* (2022) indicated that development in whatever form and context is an expectation of a state and people. This is premised on the fact that it offers opportunities for growth, well-being and advancement. Most importantly, development as a social reality and process is dimension-ed in various strands and significance. Hence, references were often made to economic, political and social development. This indication further entrench complexity and vague in the indicators and variables of measuring and scaling conditions advancing the process of development.

These variables and indicators are further embellished as Todaro and Smith (2011) **remarked** that there are three core values or goals of development sought by all individuals and societies because they relate to basic human needs that found expression in almost all societies and cultures at all time. These core values of development are:

- a. Sustenance: The ability to meet basic needs. All people have certain basic needs including food, shelter, health and protection. When any of these is absent or in short supply, a condition of "*absolute underdevelopment*" exist.
- b. Self-Esteem: To be a person. A second universal component of the good life is self-esteem. A

sense of worth-and self-respect of not being used as a tool by others for their own ends. All people and societies seek some basic form of self-esteem, although they may call it authenticity, identity, dignity, respect, honor, or recognition.

- c. Freedom from Servitude: To be able to choose. The third and final universal value of development is the *concept of human freedom*. Freedom as a core value of development entails sense of emancipation from alienating material conditions of life, and from servitude to nature, other people, misery, oppressive institutions, and dogmatic beliefs, especially that poverty is predestination.

As Todaro and Smith (2011) concluded that development is both physical reality and state of mind in which society has, through some combination of social, economic, and institutional processes, secured the means of life. Whatever these specific components of better life implied, development in all societies must have at least be informed by the following objectives:

- a. To increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods such as food, shelter, health and protection.
- b. To raise levels of living, including in addition to higher income, the provision of more jobs, better education, and greater attention to cultural and human values, all of which will serve not only to enhance materials well-being but also to generate greater individual and national self-esteem.
- c. To expand the range of economic and social choices available to individuals and nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other people and nation-states but also to the forces of ignorance and human misery.

Basically, Todaro and Smith's conceptualization of development serve as a framework from which security and development of eastern states of Nigeria are assessed. Nonetheless, the functional process of constituency representation is explored as a viable approach in response to crises of security and development of eastern states of the federation.

Theoretical Discourse

Governance in legislative advocacy and constituency representation is undoubtedly a functional process. Also, security and development in scale and process are indications of functionality. To theorize constituency representation in context of security and development of a region underlines essence of structures and roles for response and impact. Hence, the theory of structural-functionalism is appropriate framework of analysis in this discourse.

In a historic sense, the theory of structural-functionalism originated from the sphere of social anthropology in the writing of Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski. The theory was developed in Sociology Discipline by Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton and Marion Levy as Gabriel Almond and his associates developed it into a tool of political analysis (Gaubu, 2003).

To underline its empirical imperatives, Talcott Parsons remarked that every political system

perform four basic *functions*: adaptation, goal attainment, integration and pattern maintenance. Each of these basic functions was carried out by four analytic sub-systems: the social, cultural, personality and behaviour organism. Thus, Talcott Parsons indicated that these functions were collectively regarded as necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of political system (Verma, 1974).

Subsequently, the scholarly treaties of Gabriel Almond and his colleagues watershed the imperatives of structural-functionalism in political analysis which acknowledged the import of structures and roles in sustenance of political system. As Verma illuminate Almond's conceptualization of political system as *a system of interaction to be found in all independent societies performing functions of integration and adaption*. In this sense, Gauba (2003) revealed that Almond and his associates discerned four input and three output functions. Input functions are political socialization and recruitment (family, peer group, school), interest articulation (interest groups), interest aggregation (political parties) and political communication (mass media) and output functions include rule-making (legislature), rule-application (executive) and rule-application (judiciary).

In a broad perspective, the basic assumptions of structural-functional analysis as identified from Almond's, Talcott Parsons' and Robert Merton's analogies are summarized and embellished below:

- I. Every political system emerge as a single interconnected structures that perform specific functions.
- ii. Structures refer to arrangements within the system which perform functions.
- iii. Every structure is guided by aims and principles for functionality.
- iv. Functions represent roles which are discharged by the structures of the system within framework of laws and procedures.
- v. Structures can function in exclusivity and multiplicity.
- iv. The stress or systemic failure that emanate from a sub-system adversely affect viability of other structures in function-performance.
- vi. A social system has tendency towards stability maintained by virtue of inbuilt mechanism of structures and roles.

Like other explanatory frameworks, arguably, theory of structural-functionalism is also susceptible to contextual, methodological and ideological limitations. First, inspite of the fact that most political systems across the world share reflective attributes in structure and functions however peculiarities in system dynamics and expectations differ in view to the volatile environment of south-eastern states of Nigerian federation that are currently grappling in crises of insecurity and development. Hence, the dynamics of security and development challenges in south-east stemmed from the intersectionality of multi-faceted problems beyond deficiencies of state institutions but lent credence to systemic failure. In same vein, Apter (1965) argued that

structural-functional analysis tends to focus primarily on static relationships rather than on dynamics. Thus, it is argued that problems of systemic survival can be mitigated through stable adaptation, and the operation of the various functions and structures oriented towards systems maintenance. In reference to methodological limitation, Bhambhri (1973) revealed that structural-functionalism in context diminished the purpose of their approach by misapplying tools of empirical investigation while studying the political systems. Hence, it is rhetorically asked how principles of empirical investigation devised in the sophisticated study rooms applied to the study of poor and background countries of the Afro-Asia world without consideration of disparity in social and political realities between these countries? From this indication, Young (1988) indicated that the approach suffers from, what is termed by Marion Levy, *the 'fallacy of functional teleology'* which creates unwarranted twisting and distorting of empirical realities in the interests of conceptual and theoretical neatness. Thus, more critical examination of the structural-functional approach from a strictly ideological point of view shows that it is all nothing else than exercise to defend and justify the statquo, *capitalism*. In other words, the assumptions of the theory as argued may not lent logical relevance to neo-capitalist economies like Nigeria which regions like South-East grapple in systemic challenges of security and development.

However, inspite of these limitations, the assumptions of theory of structural-functionalism is instructive to this discourse. To apply the assumptions of theory of structural-functionalism, the local government system of eastern states of the federation is made up of 95 sub-systems consist of legislative output structures of governance known as *Councils*. Rural Councils made up of councilors that represent and legislate for 1, 246 electoral wards (constituencies) across the five states of the eastern region. These rural legislative councils respectively function in the framework of Local Government Administration Laws (aims, principles and procedure) of their respective states to represent constituents in electoral wards.

Presumably, systemic failure of security and development in eastern states (if established) undermine governance structures and functions. To this end, the discourse explored viability of rural legislative structure in functionality of constituency representation as a response to system stability. Since systems has tendency towards stability driven by functions of structures.....In other words, the discourse dissect significant or insignificant correlation between interlinked security-development crises and constituency representation in electoral wards of eastern states. In addition, the discourse adopted structural-functional framework to underline relevancy of constituency representation in crises of security and development in eastern states of Nigeria.

South-East States in Dysfunctional Trend of Security and Development Crises

The eastern states of Nigerian federation are Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo referred as southeast region. The Table below revealed square miles kilometers and population of eastern states:

Table 4.1 : States, Square Kilo meters and Population i n South-East Region of Nigeria Federation

State	Square kilometers	Population
Abia	6, 320 sq.m	4 million
Anambra	4,884 sq.m	6 million
Ebonyi	5, 533 sq.m	4 million
Enugu	7, 161 sq.m	5 million
Imo	5,530 sq.m	6 million
Total	29,428	25 million

Source: Adapted from PCL -State Performance Index (2025) and stru ctured into table by the Author.

Figure 1: The Map of South-East States in Intersection with Nigeria and Africa Territories



Source: Adapted from Osufor (2021) and structured by the Author.

Beyond territorial and demographical indices, Southeast Agric-Report (2023) documents that agriculture and commerce are the mainstay of the regional economy and development. The zone also known for its commerce and trading activities with a preponderance of micro, small and medium indigenous industries which are into manufacturing, fabrication and agro-allied produce. Agriculture thrives very well because of the potency of its soil fertility and arable land. The main food crops grown in the zone include yam, cassava, rice, cocoyam and maize while the cash crops include oil-palm, rubber, cocoa, banana and various types of fruits. Beside the crops, the zone is blessed with solid minerals and natural resources in rich deposits such as crude oil, natural gas, bauxite and iron ore, sand stone, lignite, kaolin, clay, coal, tin, etc. Significantly, the zone has high potential to attract investments in the following areas:

- i. Agro-allied industries (cassava starch and flour as well as fruits and vegetable canning).
- ii. Textiles (cotton socks, fishing nets and mosquito nets).

- iii. Industrial minerals/quarrying (glass industry, table ware, aggregate plant, stone crushing plants).
- iv. Plastics industry (plastics manufacture, bottles, flask, cans, tubes and bags tiles).
- v. Chemical industry (polyethylene, explosives, self-adhesive tape, pulp and paper) in south-east region (Southeast Agric-Report, 2023).


Unfortunately, the development value of these potentials has come under serious security threats as SMB-Intel Report (2025) revealed that between August 2021 and May 2025, the south east region had experienced deepening security crises with rapid rise in 332 violent attacks and 776 deaths. As Imo leads as the most restive state with 130 violent incidents and 332 death followed by Anambra state with 94 violent incidents and 202 deaths. Although, no state in the region is spared but Imo and Anambra are worst hit linked to IPOB/ESN activity and Fulani herders-farmers' clashes.

The incidents and fatalities are presented in the Table below:

Table 4.2: Violent Incidents and Fatalities in South-East (From August 2021 to May 2025)


State	Statistics of Incidents	Percentage	Statistics of Fatalities	Percentage
Abia	35	10.54	74	9.54
Anambra	94	28.31	202	26.03
Ebonyi	30	9.04	61	7.86
Enugu	43	12.95	107	13.79
Imo	130	39.16	332	42.78
Total	332	100	776	100

Source: SBM Violence Tracker (2025) cited in SMB-Intel Report (2025) and structured in percentages by the author.



Source: Author’s design from the data culled from Table 4.2.

Figure 3. Fatalities in South-East (From August 2021 to May 2025)




Source: Author’s design from the data culled from Table 4.2.

Table 4.3: Cumulative Indication of Incidents and Fatalities in Southeast (From August 2021 to May, 2025)

Year	Incidents	Fatalities
2021	49	137
2022	60	128
2023	79	123
2024	133	313
2025	11	75
Total	332	776


Source: SBM Violence Tracker (2025) cited in SMB-Intel Report (2025) and structured in percent by the author.

**Figure 4: Summative Indication of Violent Incidents in Southeast
(From August 2021 to May, 2025)**



Source: Author’s design from the data culled from Table 4.3.

**Figure 5: Summative Indication of Fatalities in Southeast
(From August 2021 to May, 2025)**



Source: Author’s design from the data culled from Table 4.3.

Subsequently, Amnesty International Report (2025) revealed the following disturbing security incidents and locations exacerbating tension in the south-east region:

- a. Clashes between farmers and herders over grazing lands where herdsmen killed an unspecified number of people between 2019-2023 in Enugu and Ebonyi states.
- b. Since 2020, there have been several attacks on enforcement personnel as gunmen killed security agents and residents.
- c. Between January 2021 and June 2023, over 1,844 people were killed in the South-East region in cases of abductions, mob violence, and electoral thuggery.
- d. The Nigerian military has committed human rights violations during military operations in the South-East. These operations include “*Operation Python Dance*” or “*Operation Egwu Eke*” (from November to December 2016), “*Operation Python Dance II*” (September 2017), and “*Operation Udo Ka*” (October 2023). Violations committed by the Nigerian military during these operations include arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, and destruction of homes.
- e. The enforcement of the sit-at-home order issued by IPOB in the South-East on 9 August 2021 has led to human rights abuses (violations of rights to life, freedom of movement and education) by members of IPOB/ESN across states of the region.
- f. The Nigerian military has carried out several airstrikes in several locations in the South-East Region. In Imo state, Orlu and Orsu towns suffered air raids on 14 February 2021 followed by Amuzi and Odenkwume communities in Ihitte/Uboma on 21 May 2021 and Aku Ihube in Okigwe. In Anambra state, communities like Orsumoghu in Ihiala LGA experienced airstrikes on 11 August 2023 as Mother Valley Orsumughu also had its ugly experience on 26 September 2023.
- g. In Imo state, the gunmen operate from camps located in forests in Okigwe, Mbaitolu, Arondizuogu, Ihiteukwa, Ihitenansa, Okwudo, Agwa, Izombe, Umuorji Mgbidi, Ihube, Atta, Aku Umulolo, and Njaba River on the Awo-Omamma and Ezioha border.
- h. In Anambra state, the gunmen operate from camps located in forests in Lilu, Ukpör, Ezinifite Nnewi, Unubi, Akwaihedi, Umunze, Isseke, Mbosi, Ihiala, Azia, Okija, Uga, Idara Nnebo, Ihembosi, Ukpör and Mother Valley in Orsumughu.
- i. In Enugu state, the gunmen also operate from camps located at Nkwere Inyi Forest in Oji River.
- j. In Ebonyi state, the gunmen operate from camps located in forests in Mgbalukwu, Inyimagu Izzi.
- k. The police appear to be unable to tackle insecurity crisis or to carry out arrests in several parts of the South-East, including Ihiala LGA of Anambra state, following the spate of attacks on security agents by gunmen.
- l. Many communities, including Agwa, Izombe and their neighbouring communities in Oguta

LGA of Imo state could be described as “ungoverned spaces” due to the activities of gunmen who have taken total control of the communities.

- m. In several towns in Anambra state, including Obosi, Awka, Onitsha, Ogidi and Umuoji, cult groups operate unchecked occasioned with a thriving drug business as hundreds were killed in cultism-related clashes.
- n. The Nigerian authorities have continued to clampdown on IPOB supporters, with several cases of unlawful killings and extrajudicial executions, excessive use of force, torture and other ill-treatment, arbitrary arrests, detention, and unfair trials of suspected IPOB members.

Consequently, Ukwu, et al (2024) stressed that crisis of insecurity in South-East Nigeria has had profound socio-economic impacts. The economic consequences of insecurity in the region have been severe. Poverty rates have surged, climbing from 35% in 2017 to 58% in 2023, driven by the destruction of farms and businesses, which has left many households unable to meet basic needs. States like Ebonyi and Enugu have experienced severe hardships with rural communities repeatedly attacked as agricultural activities and productivity was disrupted. For example, cassava output dropped from 300,000 metric tons in 2018 to 180,000 metric tons in 2023. Fear of violence has also deterred investment, contributing to a 40% decline in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the South-East compared to other regions. The region has also borne significant human costs with over 1,200 lives lost and property worth ₦200 billion destroyed between 2020 and 2023. Herders' attacks in communities like Eha-Amufu and Uzo-Uwani have caused a 40% loss in harvests and destroyed 70% of livestock which further compound food insecurity.

In addition, the SMB-Intel Report (2025) document that the southeast in 2021 since the IPOB-enforced sit-at-home has suffered immense losses including an estimated N7.6 trillion (\$4.6 billion) in economic damage. Key sectors like trade, transportation and SMEs have been crippled with income losses averaging 50-70 percent. Tragically, macro-business lose N4.6 trillion annually as transporters in the region forfeit N10 to N13 billion in climate of uncertainties. IPOB originally conceived is not solely responsible for violent attacks and kidnapping occurring in the region instead the emergence of self-described “*indigenous unknown gunmen*” and opportunistic criminal groups is blamed for hijacking what was initially a more cohesive if aggressively articulated, protest movement. These groups are reportedly carrying out criminal activities such as kidnap for ransom further obscuring any legitimate political aims of the initial agitation and highlighting the dangerous trajectory set in motion by calls for armed confrontation.

Consequently, the Report of Federal Republic of Nigeria in Multi-dimensional Poverty Index (MPI) periodically published by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2022 indicated that approximately 10.85 million people in South-East, Nigeria are grappling in multifaceted conditions of misery and deprivation. As 70.2 percent of this vulnerable population groaning in inadequacies of social services (health, education, energy, water) to health challenges of

malnutrition, child mortality and socio-political exclusion in decision processes occasioned with intensity of insecurity challenges (abduction for ransom, rape, organ sale) in communities across the five eastern states. Further breakdown from recent report updates as revealed by Nexter Desk Report (2025) indicated that Ebonyi state has 78 percent of its population in multidimensional poverty index followed by Enugu State with 63 percent of its population as Imo, Abia and Anambra trailed behind with 25 percent, 29.8 percent and 14.78 percent respectively.

Todaro and Smith's core fundamentals of development (sustenance, self-esteem and freedom from servitude) have been eroded in dysfunctional trend of security and development crises. Hence, constituency representation of electoral wards in the region becomes pertinent to complement efforts to strengthen governance process in rural communities conceived as hotbed of criminality and poverty.

Fundamentals of Constituency Representation in Rural Governance for Secured and Developing South-East States in Nigeria

Emphatically, the intensity of crises of insecurity and development in eastern region is a function of dysfunctional trend in governance process. These challenges remained undaunted and unabated because of widening gap between the government and people beginning from the grassroots' governance process.

The structure of rural constituencies in presidential-model of local government system in eastern states of Nigeria federation is explicit in the Table below:

Table.5.1 : Local Government Area and Electoral Wards in Southeast, Nigeria

State	Local Government Area	Percentage	Electoral Wards	Percentage
Abia	17	17.9	184	14.8
Anambra	21	22.1	326	26.2
Ebonyi	13	13.7	171	13.7
Enugu	17	17.9	260	20.9
Imo	27	28.4	305	24.4
Total	95	100	1, 246	100

Source: Adapted from Reports of Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015) and structured into percentages by the Author.

What are the issues? Basically, local government system in Nigeria nay the south-east region exist as subordinating tier of government in a federation of high concentration of power on national and state. To this extent, the local government system is dependent in structure, function and process amid genuine concerns and interventions. Today, the local government structures grapple in systemic problems occasioned with attitudinal and institutional deviance. An insight into current realities showed a local government system that state assemblies legislate for its existence, structure and function. A local government system where state chief executives exert

influence through statutory institutions (ministry of local government, ministry of chieftaincy affairs and ministry of rural development), agencies (state election management body) and its fund under the control of Joint Account Committee, JAC inspite of the landmark judgment by Supreme Court on July 2024. In these unpleasant realities, genuine efforts therefore become crucial to *save what is left from a failing system* in response to anxieties and expectations of Nigerians in the South-East region.

What are the fundamentals? The first fundamental is to reposition rural legislative process in response to problems of insecurity and poverty which begins with the alteration of Local Government Administration Laws in the five eastern states. A cursory assessment of these legal frameworks showed gap in mechanisms and processes for the *Council* (legislature) to function optimally in its primary and coordinated roles. Hence, House of Assemblies in understanding with Chief Executives (Governors) in south-east should find it necessary to review existing Local Government Administration Laws to strengthen the *rural legislative councils* in view of current realities of insecurity and development challenges. A functional local legislative council in law and practice is the foundation for an effective representation of community plights and expectations.

The second fundamental is state commitment to reposition local government to function efficiently in response to community plights of insecurity and poverty. Beside the alteration of Local Government Administration Law, there is need for state non-interference in the monthly allocation of local government through Joint Account Committee, JAC and, the need for state to refrain from overbearing influence in local government affairs through state bureaucratic offices. A reformed local system that functions in institutional and financial autonomy will enable rural legislative council to function in the expectations of the people for security and development. In other words, a reformed local government system through altered laws demands efficiency, transparency and accountability from the councilors in representation of electoral wards.

Another fundamental is change in erroneous perception of *electoral wards*. Most Nigerians view electoral wards as unit of communities that serve purposes of election not necessarily representation. Constituents of these wards (both in rural and urban communities) feel the euphoria of elite contact and indulgence only during party rallies and campaign for local government election or state polls. As councilors are seen as *errand boys* of state political elite and community stakeholders not as *representatives of the people*. This perception lent credence to the failure of ward representation in rural governance. The negative perception will change when the State Assemblies and Chief Executives show genuine concerns to review existing laws to bolster the relevancy of councillorship in rural legislative governance and *check mechanism* that demands accountability of representation from the councilors.

Again, skill exposure is expedient for competencies in the representation of electoral wards. Observably, the value of skill exposure is often felt during induction workshop or local government retreat for the newly elected chairmen and councilors. After these events, there is no sense of urgency to *bring them back again* to assess performance from *what was taught, reflect over emerging exigencies in task assigned, retrain and re-energize for optimal functioning*. To

this end, the need for periodic educational advocacy for the councilors is very fundamental as they understand the task, exigencies and expectations of representation especially in a time of intractable security and development challenges bedeviling communities(rural and urban) across the 95 local government areas of South-East states.

Incentive is also fundamental for a functional constituency representation. As a measure for the review of Local Government Administration Laws, the State Assemblies in understanding with Chief Executives should define, specify and provide a designated fund (*Rural Constituency Fund*) for constituency projects in electoral wards. Councilors beside enactment of bye-laws should be empowered with *Rural Constituency Fund* to undertake specific development services and projects to ameliorate hardship and improve social welfare in the electoral wards. In addition, mechanism should be put in place to check against corrupt practices in access and use of the fund.

The unknown gunmen, bandits, abductors, organ-sellers and other criminal gangs operate from forests and hide-outs in communities as revealed by security reports & updates from South-East states. The soft targets of these criminals are vulnerable unarmed villagers in their homes, farms and markets. In this regard, Councilor-Community Policing Initiative, CCPI is innovated in this discourse to underline the import of constituency representation in safety of electoral wards across the five eastern states. Councilor-Community Policing Initiative, CCPI is an innovated idea that will debut an inclusive security mechanism aimed to complement efforts of the state enforcement agencies through surveillance, forest guarding and response. The leadership structure of CCPI shall include councilors, Igwe/Eze/Nze representatives, community President Generals, PGs, leadership of community vigilante, leadership of community youths, Divisional Police Officer, representatives of Hausa/Fulani community and officials of state government. The mechanism shall meet periodically to review reports of security concerns and take measures of safety where sensitive security threat is referred to the state in a leadership provided by the councilors from electoral wards of a local government. The funding of the CPPI shall be undertaken by the local government or in collaboration with state government or corporate organization located in the localities.

Electoral wards in its demography and size in South-East states consist of communities organized in structure of Igwe/Eze/Opara/Nze and the council of titled elders, executives of town development unions, leadership of age-grades, leadership of village aborigines, leadership of community youths and leadership of women groups-differentiated in *affiliations of umuada (daughters) and the married women*. These community stakeholders represent peculiar and wider interests of the electoral wards which should conventionally seek for the indulgence of the councilors. It therefore becomes pertinent for the rural lawmakers to initiate interactive process like Town Hall meeting to *know what the problems are?; to inform the stakeholders and constituents on efforts made to mitigate these problems; to reveal to them issues that emerged or issues that may arise in the process of mitigating these problems; to seek for their views on how best these problems could be handled beyond the councilor's contacts and resources; and; finally give possible and valid assurances that these problems will be solved*. This interactive in periodic process build public confidence and bridge the communication gap between the

councilors and constituents in constituency representation. From this indication, certain security and development challenges can be addressed more efficiently in climate of consultation, understanding and confidence between the councilor, community stakeholders and constituents.

Offices and logistics for councilors of electoral wards are very important for optimal performance in constituency representation. Observably, rural lawmakers across many electoral wards in local government areas in South-East do not have offices in their constituencies. Many operate from their offices at the local government headquarters while others operate from their residential homes in town far away from the community/communities they are representing. Even the offices at local government headquarters across the South-East states are deplorable in shape as many councilors groan in logistic inadequacies to perform their duties. To mitigate the discomfiting situation, intervention can come from local government in collaboration with state government to build and furnish constituency offices for councilors in communities they represent. State government can also intervene to provide official vehicles and other logistics for the councilors as they work to identify and mainstream community interest in rural governance. If the state and local government fail to make these provisions then the community, private persons and firms (as corporate social responsibility) can intervene to provide office building and other logistics for optimal constituency service. This measure will facilitate contact, prompt response and efficiency of the councilors in their duties as representatives of the people.

These fundamentals as dissected are valuable but inexhaustible in exploring ways to bolster constituency representation of 1, 246 electoral wards in 95 local government areas of five South-East states of Nigeria federation for security and development. The rural lawmakers, *the councilors* are the nearest government functionaries to community expectations before *the state assembly, federal house and senatorial lawmakers*. To add, the safety and development of the nation begins from communities where resources for growth are concentrated. To this end, *functional indulgence* in the challenges and expectations of the people begins with constituency representation of the lowest unit of communities, *the electoral ward*.

Conclusion

The study concluded in the need for enhanced constituency representation of rural/urban electoral wards as a measure to complement efforts to ensure a safe and developing South-East region. Ndigbo earnestly look forward for a stable, secured and prosperous region under functional and efficient governance structures at rural level of policy administration, representation and development.

References

- Adesina A, (2025). *Reimagining Nigeria by 2050*. A Speech delivered at the occasion of 20th Anniversary Dinner of Chapel Hills Denham on April 28.
- Adebayo, A (2017). Security has failed in Nigeria..... *Review of Public Management Journal, Vol.3 (2)*.
- Amnesty International Report (2025). *A Decade of Impunity: Attacks and Unlawful Killings in South-East, Nigeria*. Abuja: Amnesty International.
- Ani B, (2022). *Handbook on Security: Concept and Security*. Awka: Amobi Printing Press.
- Apter, D (1965). *Politics of Modernisation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Asimiyu O, and Adebola B, (2019). *Constituency-Legislative Relations in Nigeria in* Fashagba Y, Ajayi M, and Nwankwo C, (Ed) *The National Assembly*. Switzerland: Springer.
- Bhambhri, C (1973). Functionalism in Politics. *Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 11(4)*
- Duru S, (2014). *Security and Insecurity: Reality of Operational Failures in Nigeria*. A Conference Paper Presented at Security Summit on Boko Haram Terrorism held at Emerson Resort, Calabar, January 10th to 11th.
- Eulau H, and Karp D, (1977). The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness. *Journal of Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2(3): 233–54*.
- Ezeilo J, (2021). Development and Security Challenges in South-East, Nigeria: A Regional Approach. *Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 1(2)*.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (2025). *Consumer Price Index*. Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (2022). *Multi-dimensional Poverty Index*. Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015). *Information Kit for 2015 General Election*. Abuja: Independent National Electoral Commission.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015) *Directory of Polling Units: Abia State*. Abuja: Independent National Electoral Commission.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015) *Directory of Polling Units: Anambra State*. Abuja: Independent National Electoral Commission.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015) *Directory of Polling Units: Ebonyi State*. Abuja: Independent National Electoral Commission.

- Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015) *Directory of Polling Units: Enugu State*. Abuja: Independent National Electoral Commission.
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015) *Directory of Polling Units: Imo State*. Abuja: Independent National Electoral Commission.
- Gauba P, (2003). *An Introduction to Political Theory*. India: Macmillan Ltd.
- Gbolahan S, (2023). Insecurity Challenges in Nigeria: Way out of Seeming Despondency. *This Day Newspaper, Wednesday, September 6, 2023*
- Heywood A, (2007). *Politics*. New York. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Johari C, (2005). *Comparative Politics*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishing House.
- Loewenberg G, and Patterson S, (1979). *Comparing Legislatures*. Boston: Little Brown & Co.
- Madubuegwu C, and Nkwede J, (2016) *Structural Organization of Government in* Madubuegwu C, and Odizobodo, I (Ed) *Political Science: An Introductory Reading*. Enugu: Ingenious Creations Services Ltd.
- Madubuegwu C, and Maduekwe C, (2022). Governance and Crisis of National Integration in Nigeria: A Systemic Analysis. *Socialscientia Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, ISSN: 2636-5979, Vol.7(2).
- Madubuegwu C, Okechukwu Paul, and Onjejebu E, (2021). Nigerian Political Development: Theoretical and Empirical Nexus. *Nigerian Journal of Social Development*, ISSN: 2814- 1105, Vol.10(1).
- Madubuegwu C, (2024). Nature and Essence of Governance: An Insight. *Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, ISSN: 2636-5979 <https://journal.aphriapub.com/index.php/ss/>
- Mahajan D, (2003). *Political Theory: Principles of Political Science*. New Delhi: Chand & Company Ltd.
- Mezey M, (2011). *Representation and Constituency Relation*. New York: Center for International Development.
- Mukhtar H, (2022). Security and Economic Implications of Herder-Farmer Conflicts in Nigeria. *Journal of African Studies*, 30(1), 89–102.
- Mohammed M, (2019). *Security, Banditry and Blame Politics: The Way Forward*. Zaria: Amina Press.
- Nwanegbo C, and Odigbo, J. (2013). The Role of Governance in Promoting Security. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*. 3(4), 285- 291.
- Nexter Desk Report (2025) *Regional Assessment in Security and Development Indicators*. Abuja: Nexter.

- Okoli A, Ujumadu V, Alaribe U, Alozie C, Odu E, & Iheaka, L. (2022). Insecurity in South-East: Are Governors Overwhelmed or Not Working Together? *Online Vanguard*.
- Okoli A, Lenshie N, and Jatau M, (2025). Security Governance and the Necessity for Community-led Approaches in Nigeria. *African Solutions Journal* 6 (1).
- Okonkwo R, (2015). The Socio-Economic Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency in North-East Nigeria. *African Studies Quarterly*, 17(4), 78– 92.
- Okafor E, (2019). *Handbook on Politics of National Development in Nigeria*. Enugu: Omega Publishers.
- Osufor K, (2021). *Challenges to the Fourth Republic in Nigerian*. Enugu: Snaap Pres Ltd.
- Owo N, (2021). Digitization of Security Responses in Nigeria: Failures and Benefits. *Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, Vol.2(5).
- PCL-State Performance Index (2025) *National Assessment Report*. Abuja: Philips Consulting.
- Rehfeld A, (2005). *The Concept of Constituency: Political Representation, Democratic Legitimacy and Institutional Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SMB-Intel Report (2025). *Four Years of Disruption: Unmasking the Impact of IPOB's Sit-at-Home Order in Southeast Nigeria*. Available Online: <https://www.sbmintel.com>
- Stoker G, (1998). Governance as Theory: Five Propositions. *International Social Science Review*, 50 (155).
- Southeast Agric-Report (2023) *The Land is Green and Arable*. Sapele: Institute for Agricultural Research.
- Tadaro M, and Smith S, (2011). *Economic Development*. London: Pearson Inc.
- Udenna-Okpor A, (2024). *Crises of Insecurity in South-East and Failure of Nigeria Government* in Odizaku, E and Okoye, A (Ed). *Nigerian Government and Politics*. Umahia: Godwin Bookshop and Publishers.
- Ukwu F, and Mamah I, (2025). Insecurity and Socio-Economic Challenges: South-East of Nigeria. *African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research* ISSN: 2732-4990(Print)ISSN: 2732-5008.
- Uzoh N, (2025). Insecurity, Poverty and Development Challenges in Nigeria. *Journal of Research in Business and Management* Volume 13, Issue 1 (2025) pp: 51-21 ISSN(Online):2347-3002.
- Verma S, (1974). *Modern Political Theory*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing Company.
- Wilson B, (2017). *Ideologies of Representation*. New York: Allen Inc.
- Young, R (1988). *Systems of Political Science*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.