

SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS AND SECURITY IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA

Azu, Victoria N. & Inyikalum, Daniel

Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria
victoria.azu@uniport.edu.ng

Abstract

The study examined the implications of security sector reforms on security in Northeastern Nigeria. The role reforms necessitated the investigation play in improving national and individual security. Data for this study was generated from secondary sources. Due to its broad perspective, the study applied the structural functionalism theory to provide insight into the security sector and its contribution to the Nigerian state's overall functions. The paper discovered that the prevalence of poverty, underdevelopment, and insecurity in the North East has worsened due to a lack of effective reform measures, which affected the performance of the security architecture. The paper concludes that there is a need to reform the security sector to ensure the security of lives and properties and protect human rights. Consequently, in order to address the deficiencies inherent in the security sector, the paper recommends that the government within the region should establish a comprehensive reform agenda to address security challenges, involvement civil society groups in reform efforts, and, above all, develop the required political will to fight terrorism. If these strategies are adhered to, it leads to a systematic process of tackling the security issues within the region and the entire country.

Keywords: Security Sector Reform, Insecurity, North East, Nigeria

Introduction

From the period Nigeria attained political independence from the British in 1960 till the early 1980s, the geopolitical region of North-East Nigeria (which includes the states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe) experienced peace and a good measure of security. The alertness of the security agencies, particularly the native and national police and various societal vigilante groups, ensured that people's lives and property were well protected. The various ethnic groups within the region lived in harmony with one another. A sound judicial system and community policing in local government areas helped people conduct themselves well (Abiodun, 2010).

However, the Maitatsine riots in Bulunkutu, the present Gombe State, and Jimeta, which is in Adamawa, on 26th October 1982 and 27th February 1984, respectively, marked the beginning of a decline in this relative level of security in the 1980s. There were 3,350 deaths in Bulunkutu alone during four days of intense fighting on 26th October 1982, while the death toll in Yola was estimated to be between 700 and 1000. Since then, this level of insecurity has risen to an alarming height. The most notable are the North-East insurgency, national attacks, the herders crisis, kidnappings, and deaths. Unfortunately, these problems are made worse by new, unconventional security threats like armed bandits and the proliferation of dangerous weapons (Amos, 2020). The situation continues to deteriorate in the North-East and spreads to other parts of the country. Sheriff and Ipinmoye (2015) state that the government's response has been haphazard and generally ineffective.

At the end of the 1990s, security experts and advocates for democracy began to see security sector reform (SSR) as a crucial idea. It is a relative idea whose primary goal is to provide human and state security

within a sovereign and divined geographic entity with the government. The security industry is jointly owned by the governed and the government. As a result, the primary responsibility of the security sector is to guarantee the safety of lives and property, and the governed are expected to provide helpful information that will assist the security sector in carrying out their responsibilities, provided that the formal's safety will be ensured while providing helpful information (Salawu, 2019).

The government's security system has outlived its usefulness in Nigeria and the majority of third-world nations as a whole, so private security agencies have taken over (Zack-Williams, 2021). Still, people's self-esteem and economic, social, and political development depend on the level of safety and security available to them. Development is automatically halted wherever there is no safety. "The security challenge of the 21st century in Nigeria has become almost intractable, especially given the onslaught of terrorism, a crime hitherto alien to the nation's security architecture," In a related submission, Olaleye (2018) argues that the level of insecurity experienced in the country is a clear indication that the police and other security agencies were ill-equipped to deal with the strangling issues. According to Amos (2020), the attitude and character of officers and men in the sector have not demonstrated the disposition of personnel committed to providing excellent service.

Nigeria has faced serious issues with its internal security both before and since its return to democratic rule, the most pressing of which is the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and even Gombe, attacks carried out by "Fulani Herdsmen" in states such as Benue, Plateau, Zamfara, Taraba, and Kaduna, Niger-Delta extremism and numerous kidnappings across the nation, ethno-religious conflicts, resource-based conflicts, violent crimes, and election-related violence also pose security concerns. These difficulties impede economic growth and political stability in Nigeria and the West African sub-region. Individual liberties, safety and security, access to justice, and the governance of the security sector by civilian oversight mechanisms have all been criticised due to Nigeria's prolonged military rule (Abdu, 2013). The security industry's lack of integration into a democratic governance framework is a significant weakness in Nigeria's Security Sector Governance (SSG). However, even though the legacy of colonialism, military intrusions into politics, and corruption contributed to the country's current security situation, the absence of a robust security sector governance architecture is unquestionably the primary explanation for Nigeria's poor response to security issues. Over the years, Nigeria's typical response to problems in the security sector has been to set up a few security apparatuses that work in tandem with the traditional security sector agencies and have similar responsibilities. This strategy has not worked, and there are still many gaps (Ochereome, 2018).

Statement of the Problem

Nigeria has experienced varied forms of insecurity in recent times. As a result, the government has prioritised national security as a top priority and allocated a significant portion of its budget to address the threat. Insecurity has unquestionably developed into a serious problem in the majority of nations around the world. The circumstances in Nigeria have crumbled and demolished over the years because of unfortunate administration, defilement, political contentions, government precariousness and the powerlessness of the decision elites to convey the required profit of a majority rules system to individuals (Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2020).

Again, it is said that the general security environment in Nigeria at the moment is one of despair and hopelessness. Indeed, all indications indicate a general decline in the security architecture, necessitating immediate changes and reforms. Stability, the rule of law, security, and human rights are at risk if security

institutions do not work. The prospects for peace and stability are harmed as a result (Igbuzor, 2011). Thus, the various security apparatuses and agencies need to be reformed and better equipped to meet the demands of the country's current security challenges in light of the unprecedented rise in crime, particularly terrorism-related crimes, and their level of sophistication (Eguiluz, 2020).

Throughout the region, there have been persistent attacks, with border communities suffering the most. The severe insecurity brought on by numerous violent conflicts and ethno-communal conflicts has been the greatest obstacle to the Nigerian state's survival and sovereignty over the past decade. This study is necessary because reforms to the security sector are needed to manage these crises effectively.

The objectives of the study were to critically examine the impact of Poor Governance and the need for security sector reforms in Nigeria; explore the crisis of insecurity and state fragility in North East Nigeria and examine the challenge of security sector reforms in Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework adopted in this study is the structural functionalism theory. Because of its broad perspective, the structural functionalism theory provides some insight into the topic of "Security Sector Reform and Insecurity in North East Nigeria." The theory has been developed with the help of scholars like Talcott Parsons, Malinoskiwi, and Emile Durkheim, among others. The theory considers society an organic whole in which each institution cooperates with the others to keep it functioning correctly. Society as a whole is made up of many different parts that are connected closely. The Nigeria Police Force, Directorate of State Security Service, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Nigeria Customs Service, and Nigeria Immigration Services, as well as the Nigerian military, all contribute to the support of the structures and machinery of the Nigerian government by providing internal security for the lives and property of Nigerians (Yemisi, 2018).

Therefore, lapses in any of these state or government security agencies directly or indirectly impact people's well-being and national development, ultimately leading to a state of general insecurity like the current experiences of the Northeast. The tragic results of Boko-Haram's terrorist attacks have resulted in the loss of lives and property. The efficiency of the majority of the country's security agencies and the efficient delivery of government services have also been impacted by this. As a result, the well-being and survival of the entire society are assured by the efficient operation of each component. According to Williams (2017), structural functionalism implies that internal security can only be ensured through inter-agency cooperation with the necessary synergy to ensure that units collaborate for the overall security of Nigerians and Nigerians.

Concept of Security and Insecurity

Security has transcended the state and its realist, state-centric position, regarded as a derivative of power (Amos, 2020). In his book "People, States, and Fear," Buzan (2019) says that the idea of security was "too narrowly founded." As a result, he offers a "broader framework of security" that includes ideas that were never thought to be part of the security puzzle before, like regional security or the societal and environmental sectors of security. Amos (2020) examined security from all angles—from the micro to the macro—as well as the social aspects of security and how individuals or societies construct or "securitise" threats, which was ground-breaking. Buzan (2019) expanded the discourse to five sectors so that the militaristic and state-centric paradigm was never considered in the threat calculation.

He insists that the "five sectors do not operate in isolation from each other" and examines how the five security sectors, Political, Military, Economic, Societal, and Environmental, may affect the "periphery" in response to shifts in the "centre." Buzan's broadening of the concept beyond a military determination of threats was partly supported by Booth (1994), but his perspective on the provider of human security was challenged. He stresses pretty explicitly that the state must be dislodged as the primary referent of (human) security and encompassed instead a wide range of non-state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and just about all humankind Booth argued that state security was used by 'governments that posed as guardians of their peoples' security, to cloak reality and hid what essentially was the security of their regime and its supporters and should therefore be dislodged as a primary referent of security' (Adagbabiri, & Okolie, 2018).

Conceptualising the Security Sector Reform

The policy of the UK-based Department for International Development (DFID) to assist countries that were previously excluded from such support by the imperative of the Cold War, "as well as to the new challenges posed by demands for an effective development donor role in conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, and anti-terrorism," was credited with the emergence of the Security Sector Reform. Bendix and Stanley (2018) conceptualised the security sector and emphasised to stakeholders that "a security sector which promotes human development, helps to reduce poverty.

They based the project's relevance to African nations on "the continuing pervasiveness of violent conflict and other security threats." Scholars link current security issues to the particular characteristics of the African state and its institutions as colonial legacies - "an appropriate concept for African states aiming to reform their security sectors in such a way as to enhance democratic control, strengthen the security of the poor, reduce the risk of violent conflict and free resources for social change," as the colonial state never had a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. This was also not necessary for extraction or military and political control. For instance, the authors noted that South Africa implemented the reform without external input, which was highly successful. However, over time, it has become part of development support from donor agencies, and many of them have failed to achieve the desired result, as was the case in Sierra Leone and Liberia. They urge donor agencies to view it as a long-term project rather than a quick fix for these issues in African states. However, there is still a gap in the discussion due to the authors' failure to identify contemporary Africans' acceptance of Western models and concepts as solutions to their problems (Salawu, 2019).

Williams (2017) asserts that "security sector reform can best be understood against the backdrop of traditional military assistance to developing countries, as well as within the context of the new alignment of political forces occurring within the developed countries." Organising a well-equipped, well-trained, and well-resourced security sector that could maintain both the government in power, the institutions of government, and the general public is the goal of security sector reform, which is a process of creating a new image of the security sector through re-orientation of the sector. Innocent (2008) examines the SSR practices of the African Police Force with critical eyes. She argues that the idea is part of the reforms that Western democracies do to improve pluralism and keep a factor that makes it hard to accept and use in Africa.

Methodology

Research design is a term used to describe several decisions that need to be made regarding data collection before other data are collected for a particular study. This paper used historical and descriptive research methods as research designs. Identifying the method and procedure adopted in this research work is important since it gives the reader background information on evaluating the findings and conclusion. Historically, the article examined writings concerning security sector reforms and security in the North East. The paper answered the subject under review's what, why, when, where, and how. The nature and sources of data collection for this study are based on secondary sources, such as library materials like textbooks and journals, published articles on the web or the Internet, conference papers, published interviews, and Newspapers and magazines. The data analysis for this study combined *historical and descriptive approaches*. Historical data from secondary sources were analysed based on their relevance to the topic under discussion. Therefore, the data analysis used content analysis, which reviews secondary data to ascertain whether they are logical and consistent.

Results and Discussion

Poor governance and the need for security sector reforms in Nigeria

Essentially, Nigeria's key security governance challenge revolves around promoting security institutions that are transparent, accountable, responsive, and fully cognizant of their roles and responsibilities. As such, there is a need to ensure adequate population security and safeguard civil liberties and freedoms codified in the Constitution and other laws. Indeed, achieving these requires fresh thinking and innovative approaches. In response to challenges such as those outlined above, Security Sector Reform (SSR) processes are designed to strengthen governance by restoring effectiveness, transparency, and accountability. SSR assumes greater importance in Nigeria considering current unprecedented security challenges, especially during the 2019 general elections and its potential to trigger violence (Nicoll, 2011).

Studies have revealed that it is difficult to find a comprehensive document detailing the Nigerian government's security policy direction (setting out security priorities, determining the roles and responsibilities of key security institutions, coordinating the implementation of security decisions, and proper institutional management of security services) or a clearly defined SSR Legislative Agenda of the national assembly. Notwithstanding, there have been attempts at policy and legislative reform of the security sector by the executive and legislative arms of government. Nigeria's development has been hindered since the 1990s by a series of violent conflicts that have fluctuated and too often escalated in intensity. They range from the long-running militant movement in the Niger Delta over international oil extraction to the explosive Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast. Other conflicts include the Igbo secessionist movements, clashes between authorities and the Shiite Islamic Movement in Nigeria, and confrontations between farmers and herders. Invariably, growing criminality and cattle rustling in the region have compounded the violence and kidnapping for ransom, which has become widespread. Many of the conflicts involve threats of direct armed confrontation with the state. All told, these simultaneous outbreaks of violence pose a direct challenge to political order in Nigeria. The humanitarian crisis resulting from a broader, more intensive conflict in Africa's most populous country could quickly spill across West Africa and the continent and give rise to an unmanageable flow of refugees (Nicoll, 2011).

The Boko Haram insurgency, in particular, cuts across the borders of Nigeria to Niger, Cameroon and Chad are the regions known as the Lake Chad Basin. The complications of collaborating across

governments and other players have made this conflict particularly confounding to these countries. Through the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the four countries are trying to cooperate on competitive resource issues related to Lake Chad, which has been drying rapidly and losing surface area. They also face a range of challenges to their democratic order and state legitimacy; powerful business groups frequently shift their alliances between the state and the insurgents based on who they think can best protect trade and provide stability. This influential merchant class is often overlooked when assessing conditions and the insurgency in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region (Mutimer, 1999).

Security, no doubt, has become the central concept at the confluence of democracy, development and security, with core elements that include accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, inclusiveness, equity and the rule of law (Bryden & Chappuis, 2015). Thus, the quality of governance determines the quality of state affairs, and the development of a state can be hindered by insecurity. That is why the governance of the security sector has often remained an issue of great concern to policymakers. In most of Africa, therefore, the root of security sector governance, as noted by (Mustapha, 2013), can be traced to pre-colonial African history, where the colonialist brought in their system, instruments, and institutions and used force not for security but for political and economic exploitation.

It is an undeniable fact that most cities in Nigeria are not secure, especially in the Northeast. As the only institution saddled with the responsibility of maintaining law and order and ensuring peaceful co-existence, the government has not effectively addressed the country's security challenges. Odunuga (2011:3) believes that "there are no safe havens anymore". Similarly, Elaigwu, analysing the nation's security situation, decried that "an atmosphere of insecurity has enveloped the polity" (Elaigwu, 2011, p. 213). This shows that insecurity is one of the significant impediments to Nigeria's development. No wonder Chinua Achebe noted that Nigeria is "no longer at ease" and things have "fallen apart" (Achebe, 1958, 1960).

Another analysis (Ukwayi & Anam, 2017) noted that the rising concern for insecurity in Nigeria deters economic activities, constitutes a significant challenge to the protection of lives and properties, discourages investors (both local and foreign), and, in turn, impedes the attainment of sustainable development. The crisis in North Nigeria remains one of the most serious humanitarian crises in the world. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2018) notes that it has resulted in human rights violations, displacement, and deepening humanitarian and developmental crises.

Apart from Nigeria's experience of the civil war between 1969 and 1970, the country had never been threatened and confronted with such a level of insecurity as we are presently experiencing from the activities of ethnic militia, kidnapers, and Boko Haram insurgency (Eke, 2013). Since 2009, over 20,000 people have been killed, children drafted into insurgency as "suicide" bombers, while thousands of girls and women have been abducted and abused. As estimated by OCHA (2018), "about 2.1 million people fled their homes, more than 1.7 million were in internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps, about 200,000 people are still in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, after having been forced to flee". Undoubtedly, a country experiencing such a magnitude of violent conflicts will suffer economic stagnation and reduced capacity to function effectively as a sovereign state. Armed conflicts hinder development and neuro-developmental foundations (Sheriff & Ipinmoye, 2015). This is the exact situation in Nigeria.

This is compounded by Boko Haram's affiliation with the self-styled Islamic State extremist movement (ISIS), producing a dimension of international terrorism and connections with violence in other countries of West Africa. Groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which initially operated mainly in Algeria but has extended its appendages into sub-Saharan Africa, contribute to tensions as weapons and extremist ideologies spread across the region. Even Boko Haram is fracturing, compounding the

complications of resolving the conflict and establishing stability (Malasowe, 2016).

Crisis of Insecurity and State Fragility in North East Nigeria

The Boko Haram insurgency represents a symptom of state fragility and exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. Prolonged and repeated struggles against a range of economic, social, and political forces have limited the capacity of the Nigerian government to carry out basic constitutional functions, such as providing for the security and welfare of its citizens. As a result, the social contract between the state and its citizens is frayed, eroding the government's legitimacy. Amidst this complex web of issues, the government of President Muhammadu Buhari sought to consolidate military gains against Boko Haram by implementing a sweeping program of humanitarian relief and social and economic assistance known as the Buhari Plan, unveiled in June 2016 and "designed to achieve the peace, stability, socio-economic rehabilitation, reconstruction, and long-term sustainable economic development of the region." The mission is frightening, as the government estimates that the conflict with Boko Haram has affected some 14.8 million men, women, and children.

The complexity of the conditions faced by local communities, national and international authorities and organisations seeking to help them rebuild raises many spectres, including the prospect of backsliding and recurring conflict: "In complex wars, it can be unclear what winning might even look like." One of the most important lessons from the war in Afghanistan is that defeating insurgents or terrorists is not an end in itself. The United States was able to wield its military "shock and awe," alongside local forces, to dislodge the Taliban regime in 2001. However, the lack of a comprehensive peacebuilding agenda to consolidate those gains has allowed the conflict and associated violence to continue (Malasowe, 2016).

Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, insecurity has greatly hindered sustainable development. While the state adopts different models to combat the security challenges generated, the shortfalls in managing security sector governance become an issue of great concern. They must be factored in as critical to sustaining development and human security. The ongoing Boko Haram insurgency in the North East is one of the most violent, destructive, and debilitating of the nation's internal security challenges since independence. The civil war of 1967 to 1970, often known as the Biafran War, had higher levels of casualties but was not as protracted as the Boko Haram insurgency. The sect, which calls itself *Jama'atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da'awatiwal-Jihad*, or Group of the Sunni People for the Calling and Jihad, is commonly known as Boko Haram, which loosely translates as "Western education is forbidden." It emerged in the early 2000s in northeastern Nigeria among the Kanuri ethnic group and its neighbours. The Kanuri ethnic elites ruled a powerful, Muslim multiethnic state known as the Kanem-Bornu Empire for about nine hundred years as various ethno-political forces competed for power and influence.

The present insurgency needs to be understood within this historical context. A further dimension is a tendency toward apocalyptic beliefs similar to those of long-established Muslim communities in the Sahel, in which a Mahdi figure, a spiritual saviour, is always expected to arrive at restoring well-being and justice. In the meantime, the sect aims to reestablish a caliphate governed by "true" Islamic law to replace Nigeria's Western constitutional system. The group turned to insurgent violence in 2009 and, in August 2011, staged a deadly car bomb attack on the United Nations (UN) office in Abuja. By 2015, in an assessment of the Annual Global Terrorism Index, the Institute for Economics and Peace ranked it as the world's deadliest militancy in history (Malasowe, 2016).

In 2009, the Nigerian government under President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua intervened by launching a primarily military effort aimed at destroying the insurgents. The succeeding administration of President

Goodluck Jonathan intensified these operations, pursuing the same goal of destroying the insurgents, regaining territory, stabilising the region, and asserting state authority. In May 2013, authorities declared a state of emergency in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. Unlike previous states of emergency declared in Plateau State in 2004 and Ekiti State in 2006, civil authority was not taken from the local elected officials. However, Boko Haram's killings, destruction, and threats drove out many officials, as well as traditional rulers, who feared for their lives. This created a legitimate vacuum, and the insurgents quickly took advantage to exercise de facto authority. State governors retained their roles as chief security officers, as provided in the Nigerian Constitution. However, their roles were severely weakened because they had no control or oversight over national security agencies, and the Nigerian military had unfettered authority in the theatre of operations. 2014, the emergency lapsed, and the Nigerian House of Representatives refused to renew it (Lanzer, Tatay, & Dewar, 2016).

Despite this, military operations continued, preventing the complete restoration of civil authority. For example, when President Buhari took office in 2015, he quickly increased military operations against Boko Haram to promote peace, security, economic revitalisation, and safety in the Northeast. Operation Lafiya Dole, a follow-up to Operation Zaman Lafiya and its predecessors, was a counterinsurgency operation launched by the Nigerian military to degrade and eliminate the insurgents and reclaim territory. Through the Multinational Joint Task Force, initially established in 1994 to combat cross-border banditry and criminal activity, the Nigerian military collaborated and coordinated with forces from neighbouring nations in each operation. In addition, to meet the challenges posed by the Boko Haram insurgency, the Task Force was reconstituted in 2015 under the auspices of the African Union and the four governments of the LCBC (Lanzer, Tatay, & Dewar, 2016).

The number of people killed in terrorist acts in Nigeria decreased from 4,940 in 2015 to 1,832 in 2016 as a result of the coordinated regional military push and internal divisions within Boko Haram. According to Isyaku (2013), deaths in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have also decreased by 75%. By the end of 2017, the Nigerian government claimed that Boko Haram had reclaimed all of the territory within its borders (Isyaku, 2013). However, Boko Haram's Mamman Nur faction, which has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, continued to operate in some parts of the Lake Chad Basin. On 19th February 2018, it was believed that this group had kidnapped 110 girls from the secondary school in Dapchi, Yobe State. On 21st March 2018, 105 girls, one additional girl, and one boy the group had held were released after negotiations with the government. According to reports, five of the girls who were taken from their homes died, and the one Christian girl who was found was still in captivity (Isyaku, 2021).

In addition, there are 1.7 million internally displaced people (IDPs), 229,000 refugees, many of whom are in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, and widespread property destruction as a result of the ravages of Boko Haram and the military operations to defeat the group. More than 1.4 million returns, including more than 1.3 million IDPs and nearly 115,000 refugees, were recorded by aid organisations in Nigeria as of April 2018. The Nigerian government employs a multi-sectoral strategy that includes state, non-state, and international actors, understanding that a long-term solution necessitates more than just military action. Nigerian authorities and the Lake Chad regional alliance must quickly develop and define a comprehensive post-conflict security and governance strategy that includes a structure for maintaining peace and security under civil control as the conclusion of counterinsurgency operations approaches (Igbuzor, 2011). The military continues to conduct operations to continue reducing the capabilities of the insurgents, who, since June 2017, have been staging sporadic attacks from camps scattered across rugged terrain (Ibeanu & Momoh, 2008). The military also provides substantial urban and rural security in liberated areas.

The military is put under too much pressure to protect liberated areas, which hinders its primary duty of protecting territorial integrity. The estimated strength of the Nigerian Armed Forces—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—is 181,000, and they are stationed in 32 of Nigeria's 36 states. The armed forces' traditional focus on protecting a regime rather than civilians exacerbates their numerical capacity issue. Working across borders can appear to be at odds with the primary objective of protecting the government, which is why the same mindset weakens interagency coordination and cooperation among these forces. The majority of residents of the Northeast have, over decades, experienced little genuine state security or any genuine government services, including development projects (Ikelegbe, 2000). This is because the focus has not been on serving civilians.

Various governments have taken different measures to deal with this problem. However, insecurity in Nigeria continues to be a contentious issue despite its staggering growth. This demonstrates that the various security measures taken to deal with the situation have not resulted in the anticipated outcome as the nation continues to face frightening, daunting, and terrifying developmental challenges due to the rising level of insecurity (2013). These challenges pose serious threats to the achievement of sustainable development. Despite claims by the government and security personnel that they are in control, there is still a sense of unease. From all indications, both the government and the security personnel appear incapable of effectively protecting the lives and property of the public.

Examining the state's approach to combating security issues is necessary. The so-called Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a militia formed to defend communities from Boko Haram alongside local hunters and other vigilante groups, has also emerged as an important corollary to the official military effort. Although levels of trust in these non-state actors vary, the LCBC governments have utilised them extensively in the Boko Haram counterinsurgency effort. The civilian makeup of the CJTF raises numerous questions as the counterinsurgency subsides and post-conflict peacebuilding begins. These units varied in capability, composition, and allegiance from the beginning; some were informal, the state-supported others, and others were semi-independent and frequently lacked accountability. Beginning in Maiduguri in early 2013, when Boko Haram escalated its use of terrorism against Islamic clerics who challenged their interpretation of Islam and civilians who worked for the state, the CJTF was born - local vigilante groups of young men armed with sticks (angora in Hausa) established to patrol and defend their communities in Borno State when the state appeared incapable of doing so as Boko Haram began using IEDs against such "soft" targets. In the end, the Nigerian military came to rely on the CJTF for intelligence gathering and assistance with checkpoint manning in some areas (Ezeah & Osayi, 2014).

The CJTF always played a crucial role in preventing the insurgents from taking Maiduguri. It also created a comprehensive administrative structure with sectors and units forward and local government administrations. In Borno State alone, approximately 26,000 volunteers make up the youth force. These civilian vigilantes make excellent use of their understanding of the local population, geography, languages, and cultures. Even though the CJTF has been primarily helpful up to this point, it could become a problem for internal security as we move away from military control, especially in border areas where smuggling is profitable, and small arms are easy to get. Their actions have occasionally raised concerns about human rights violations, discrediting the military and bringing international organisations to their attention (Ezeah & Osayi, 2014).

It is essential to acknowledge the active involvement of women in all aspects of these militia activities in the Northeast. Women have played more than just a role as victims in the counterinsurgency. For instance, the country's attention was drawn to Aisha Bakari Gombi, a former antelope hunter employed as a tracker against the insurgents (Igbuzor, 2011). In the otherwise traditionally patriarchal societies of the

Northeast, new administrative and social structures must consider these diverse roles for women (Ewetan, 2013).

The CJTF also reflects state fragility and the corresponding need for order and services, similar to Boko Haram, albeit with less extreme ideas of what local governance ought to be. The majority of CJTF members would favour constitutional political and security governance in areas where Boko Haram would impose strict Islamist rule. In the future, the counterinsurgency against Boko Haram raises two issues regarding the roles of vigilante groups and other non-state security actors like local hunters (Ewetan, 2013).

The first is how to put mechanisms for accountability in place and eventually bring these units under the control of the community and the state. The second is establishing a culture that values citizens' safety and security. Even though the CJTF's original goal was to protect civilians, some units have long shifted their focus to protecting power brokers. The Nigeria Police Force, which is in charge of law enforcement, and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, which protects vital national infrastructure and deals with related disaster management, comprise Nigeria's internal security infrastructure. In the short term, the North East's protection architecture would combine the NPF and the NSCDC for policing.

The Challenges of Implementing Security Sector Reforms in Nigeria

It is clear that there are significant obstacles to security sector reforms in Nigeria, which can be divided into two categories. First, severe resource constraints, insurgent attacks, and a mindset that prioritises regime or VIP protection have eroded the capacity of the Nigerian police and other official but non-military security forces over time (Eme & Anthony, 2011). Second, Nigerian society has become accustomed to militarised security services as the military has sought or been assigned to fill the gaps. As a result, it has lost the habit of providing security under civilian leadership. The military is currently engaged in internal operations in almost all of Nigeria's thirty-six states, according to Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, to end not only the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast but also the militancy in the Niger Delta, as well as kidnapping, cattle rustling, and armed robbery.

The NPF no longer responds to civil unrest or violence frequently. The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the clash between the Nigerian Army and the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) in December 2015 provided an example of this (Eke, 2013). The commission discovered that the Nigeria Police was aware of the IMN's excesses, including murders reported to the force for which no prosecution or arrest was made.

The police's credibility also suffered as it turned to brutal shortcuts rather than meticulous investigation and adherence to the law. In many local police departments, suspected criminals were subjected to torture and dehumanising treatment. Recent studies demonstrate that this pattern continues (Eke, 2013). However, given that the police are the primary agency in charge of investigating all crimes covered by the penal and criminal codes, it is necessary to rehabilitate and make the force operational. The chairman of the Police Service Commission, Mike Okiro, claims that there are approximately four hundred thousand police officers in Nigeria. However, more than 150,000 are assigned to guard VIPs and other individuals who usually would not be eligible for police protection, so they cannot perform routine police work. The actual situation, according to other officials, is even worse. According to Rasheed Akintunde, Assistant Inspector General for Zone 5 in Benin City in southern Nigeria, only 20% of police officers are responsible for preserving peace and protecting lives. The remaining 80% are simply working to provide personal security for a few "prominent people" (Eme & Anthony, 2011).

In an atmosphere of chaos and anarchy, meaningful development cannot occur anywhere. As a result, peace and long-term growth cannot occur without a safe environment. As a result, every government strives to provide security as a fundamental requirement for governance. Since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the nation has been plagued by several internal and external security issues. The history of Nigeria is full of internal and external threats and unrest of varying degrees, including constitutional crises, election problems, problems with the census, Civil War, clashes between state boundaries, current insurgency, countercoups, and coups.

Due to the inability of the security sectors (agencies) to prevent these crises in their infancy, most of the time, they have grown in size and complexity beyond comprehension. The majority of crises the country's security sector had to deal with in the past were primarily traditional, necessitating traditional approaches to their resolution. However, as a result of the unprecedented expansion of modern science and technology, mainly information and telecommunication technology (ICT), crime, particularly the insurgency (Boko Haram) assault in the country's Northeast, has also increased at an unprecedented rate. Multiple security threats have grown on a sustained scale due to the security agencies' inability to act professionally and proactively.

Conclusion

This paper has contributed to the body of knowledge by revealing that the pursuit of democratic control over the security sector, as well as the promotion of interactions between the security sector and civil society, can help ensure clear jurisdictions and protocols for inter-agency collaboration in security sector governance. The paper noted that the crises in Nigeria, especially in the Northeast, were exasperated by the inability of the security forces to control it from the start. Consequently, the independent states of Africa adopted and inherited the security governance process, defined by the same structures, instruments, and institutions that served their purpose. According to Mustapha (2013), the military's decision to overthrow elected political regimes rather than establish a security apparatus centred on the needs of the people was a further endorsement of this strategy. As a result, Nigeria's history recalls the military's long involvement in civil governance, especially since the country gained independence in 1960. This suggests that the military has complete control over the security institutions, particularly the institutional governance framework and conflict management mechanism (Abdu, 2013).

Thus, the long rule of the military and its enduring legacy undoubtedly had lasting effects on security institutions (Fayemi & Olonisakin, 2008) and, by extension, security sector governance. According to the preceding account, Nigeria's security sector governance has gone through three distinct historical trajectories: the colonial period, the military, and the current constitutional period. Throughout each of these trajectories, there has been a striking similarity in terms of operational structure, politics, and control, and security governance continues to function more like regime protection than public security (Abdu, 2013).

According to Bryanen, N'Diaye, and Olonisakin (2008), beginning in the 1990s, the understanding that an unreformed security sector represents a decisive obstacle to the promotion of sustainable development, democracy, and peace made security sector governance an increasingly prominent issue on national and international policy agendas. This resulted in the emergence of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) discourse, which European Development Agencies initially promoted in the late 1990s as a response to the problems caused by dysfunctional Security Sector Governance. As a result, social responsibility (SSR) became a cornerstone of multilateral strategies for crisis prevention, peacebuilding, and

development for organisations like the World Bank, ECOWAS, the European Union, and the United Nations (Bryden & Chappuis, 2015).

Therefore, it has become expedient to prioritise security sector reform in the direction of protecting citizens' fundamental and constitutional rights and protecting the nation's image while they conduct lawful business. To facilitate cordial civil-military relations, it is also necessary to bridge the gap between the citizens and the security sectors. This will make the citizens see themselves as part of the security system and, as a result, volunteer to provide useful information when necessary without fear of any risk in providing such information.

Policy recommendations

The following are proposed as recommendations:

1. The government should establish a comprehensive reform agenda to address the deficiencies in security sector reform and governance currently.
2. Non-statutory security forces and various civil society actors must be added to the list of actors participating in the security sector reform process. As a result, civil society involvement in security sector reform should be encouraged.
3. Both the course of security sector reform and addressing the developmental challenges of nation-building require political leadership's commitment to a strict agenda for reforms in the security sector.
4. The Nigerian government can seek collaboration with more international professional security institutions for support, such as the Global Coalition Against Terrorism, NATO, the USA's Global Coalition to defeat ISIS, and INTERPOL, in addition to EU, AU, and UN support.
5. To avoid situations where security officers succumb to terrorists' strengths, the government should, as part of the reform agenda, train and equip the security agencies with state-of-the-art fighting equipment and increase surveillance in the region. The government can use any means to achieve this.
6. There should always always be an increase in the security budget to enable the availability of funds for emergency operations.
7. The government, in collaboration with NGOs, organisations, communities, and other stakeholders, should think outside the box for better strategies to dictate early signs of terrorism and take proactive measures against such, even before the terrorist group strikes.
8. Above all, the government should be decisive in fighting corruption so that the security budget can be judiciously applied to fighting insurgencies.

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