

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP AND THE FIGHT AGAINST SECURITY CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Civil-military relationship in a democratic state like Nigeria describes a situation where the military establishment is obedient, by accepting subordination, to elected civilian authorities. The military is viewed as an institution geared towards defending the state against external and internal threats. Also, it is seen as one of the corner-stone of democracy in the sense that a well disciplined, trained and equipped military will not only defend the country against external aggression, but will also help protect and uphold internal democratic norms while still differing to elected or appointed civilian authority whose fundamental function as agent of the state is the protection of lives and properties of the people as contained in the social contract. But shortly after independence, Nigeria's civilian government was truncated by the military, and as it turned out obstructed the consolidation of democratic governance and has since maintained a strong influence on the emergence of political leadership even after the country has transited into a civilian democracy. The paper examine the synergy between the Nigerian civilian leadership and the military establishment in their attempt to address the rising security challenges caused by the wanton killing of people and destruction of properties going on all over the country, especially in the Northern part that is being allowed to fester with no end in sight. The study is exploratory and documentary in nature with qualitative descriptive method used in analysing textual data. Anchoring our discourse on the Agency theory of civil-military relations, findings amongst others revealed that; the inability of the military to address the rising insecurity in Nigeria is as a result of the emergence of a weak civilian/political leadership that is enmeshed in corruption, nepotism, ethnic politics and religious fundamentalism, manifested in military corruption, untrained or ill-equipped military that lacks the courage to checkmate the security challenges bedevilling the country. The paper recommends emergence of a strong civil-political leadership that is transparent and accountable to the Nigerian people and has the courage to direct the military on the most appropriate measures to take in order to address the rising security challenges in Nigeria.

Keywords: Civil-military relations, security, democracy, military establishment, agency theory.

Introduction

The military is viewed as an institution geared towards defending the state against external and internal threats. The need to ensure peaceful living in the society has necessitated the establishment of a military organization (Gerassimos, 1998). Also, it is seen as one of the corner-stone of democracy in the sense that a well disciplined, trained and equipped military will not only defend the country against external aggression, but will also help protect and uphold internal democratic norms while still differing to elected or appointed civilian authority whose fundamental function as agent of the state is the protection of lives and properties of the people as contained in the social contract. All over the world, the power of the military has drastically reduced and the military has since accepted the subordinate role to the civilian authority or leadership. The power of the military has only reduced in ideal democratic societies, where

democratic principles have been instituted (Ayeni, Uzoigwe, Sani & Dubu, 2019).

Civil military relations are not only germane in wartime but also very much relevant in peacetime to consolidate and foster mutual respect, trust and improved communication within the populace in order to enhance their democratic rights. The consolidation of democracy requires that the privileges once held by the armed forces during military or authoritarian rule be reversed. Reversing the privileges of the military as well as establishing and exercising control of the armed forces remains a challenging task for emerging democracies (Adhima, 2016). Since the introduction of liberal, western economic political institutions in peripheral states had upset the stability of the latter's traditional socio-political structure, the military appeared to be the only group capable of enforcing and preserving political stability and order (Gerassimos, 1998).

Civil-military relationship in a democratic state like Nigeria describes a situation where the military establishment is obedient, by accepting subordination, to elected civilian authorities. But shortly after independence, Nigeria's civilian government was truncated by the military, and as it turned out obstructed the consolidation of democratic governance and has since maintained a strong influence on the emergence of political leadership even after the country has transited into a civilian democracy. Since the restoration of civil rule in 1999, the security situation in the country has worsened. Hardly a day passes without the news reporting of one crisis or the other. These crises include those linked to terrorist attacks, the local farmers and cattle herders' clashes, youth militancy, kidnapping and armed banditry and cattle rustling, killing of innocent Nigerians herdsman attacks, as well as the incessant ethno-religious crisis have collectively posed serious existential threats to the peace and stability of the Nigerian state, with the government seemingly unable to find a lasting solution to these problems. The police that are supposed to prevent or address the various internal security challenges have become overwhelmed, thereby leading the federal government to deploy the military and other security agents to conflict and conflict-prone areas (Olofin, 2019).

Sadly, the increasingly deployment of the Military into every internal civil security crisis has progressively become a norm in Nigeria just as the Soldier have transformed into a permanent feature in the daily lives of Nigerian citizens. And this reign of terror continues to create tensions and deepen existing mistrust between civilians and the military on the one hand and challenges for security operatives on the other in the region and in Nigeria at large (Olofin, 2019).

Deriving from above, this paper examine the synergy between the Nigerian civilian leadership and the military establishment in their attempt to address the rising security challenges caused by the wanton killing of people and destruction of properties going on all over the country, especially in the Northern part that is being allowed to fester with no end in sight. The study is exploratory and documentary in nature with qualitative descriptive method used in analysing textual data.

Conceptual Clarification

Civil-Military Relations

Like every social science concept, the definition of civil-military relations varies depending on the perception of the scholar. Civil military relations not only recognise exchanges between civilian leaders with top military brass, but also the ordinary citizens. A healthy civil military relation is essential to the stability of democratic regimes and a toxic relationship between civilians and the soldiers will effectively produce either a weak military or one that becomes a threat to the public they are supposed to protect

(Tapia, 2016, p.2; Abdullahi & Olofin, 2019). The scope of civil-military relations has expanded more than mere fighting of war to include nation building. It is in line with this fact that Wogu and Ibietan (2014) describe civil-military relations as the relationships between the civil societies as a whole and military organization or organizations established to protect it. In other words, civil military relations encompass the broad range of relationships and experiences involving various state security actors and non-state actors within a society. It has been described by the National Defence Policy (2006) as the hierarchy of authority between the Executive, National Assembly and the Armed Forces as well as the principle of civil supremacy over the armed forces. Civil military relations according to the National Defence Policy are premised on the principle of civilian control of the military in a democracy (2006:56) (Abdullahi & Olofin, 2019). To Fayemi (2006:1), civil-military relations can be seen as part of complex political process which must address the root causes of militarism in society beyond the formal removal of the military from political power.

Civil-military relations refer broadly to interactions between armed forces as institutions and the sectors of society in which they are embedded. Most commonly, civil-military relations focus on the relative distribution of power between the government and the armed forces of a country. They involve a process in which civilian control is measured and evaluated by weighing “the relative influence of military officers and civilian officials in decisions of state concerning war, internal security, external defense, and military policy (that is, the shape, size, and operating procedures of the military establishment).” Though civilian control of the military as an aspect of democracy has attracted the attention of policymakers around the globe, it is difficult to achieve and maintain (Forman & Welch, 1998).

Civil-military relations' theory demonstrates the importance of professionalism in the military. Both founders of Civil-Military relations (Huntington and Janowitz) theory concur with Feaver (1996) about the role of professionalism in the military corps. Huntington (1957) suggests that professionalism distinguishes the military officer of late 20th century from the fighters of previous ages (Arjana, 2002). The principles underpinning Civil Military Relations in Nigeria as outlined in the National Defence Policy include and as quoted in Abdullahi and Olofin (2019): The Supremacy of the Constitution; The Democratic imperative; Civil control of the Military and Military professionalism.

Security

In the view of Akin (2008) as cited in (Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpor-Robaro, 2013), security refers to “the situation that exists as a result of the establishment of measures for the protection of persons, information and property against hostile persons, influences and actions”. It is the existence of conditions within which people in a society can go about their normal daily activities without any threats to their lives or properties. It embraces all measures designed to protect and safeguard the citizenry and the resources of individuals, groups, businesses and the nation against sabotage or violent occurrence (Ogunleye, et al, 2011). According to Igbuzor (2011) it demands safety from chronic threats and protection from harmful disruption. Omede (2012) sees security as a dynamic condition which involves the relative ability of a state to counter threats to its core values and interests. For Nwolise (2006), security is an all encompassing condition which suggests that a territory must be secured by a network of armed forces; that the sovereignty of the state must be guaranteed by a democratic and patriotic government, which in turn must be protected by the military, police and the people themselves; that the people must not only be secured from external attacks but also from devastating consequences of internal upheavals such as unemployment, hunger, starvation, diseases, ignorance, homelessness, environmental degradation and pollution cum socio-economic injustices.

Insecurity

Robert-Okah (2014) argued that insecurity is the presence or apprehension of danger to life and property, and the presence of a non-conducive atmosphere for the people to pursue their legitimate interest within the society. It embodies the presence, or apprehension of threat to, and or direct violation of security. It implies threat to individual security, state security and security of the environment. Beland (2005) defined insecurity as a state of fear or anxiety stemming from a concrete or alleged lack of protection i.e. lack or inadequate freedom from danger. These definitions reflect physical insecurity which is the most visible form of insecurity, and it feeds into many other forms of insecurity such as economic security and social security. It is however depressing that Nigeria is yet to develop a credible security policy in the face of serious, threatening, internal security challenges. Onoja (2014) opined that insecurity is peoples' relative feeling of the presence of economic, political, social, cultural and psychological fear. Some of the common descriptors of insecurity according to Adagbabiri and Okolie (2018), include: wants to safety, danger, hazard, uncertainty; want to confidence; doubtful; inadequately guarded or protected; lacking stability; troubled; lack protection and unsafe, to mention few. All of these have been used by different people to define the concept of insecurity. These different descriptors however run into a common reference to a state of vulnerability to harm and loss of life, property or livelihood.

Democracy

Democracy through voting aggregates interest and expresses policy preference. The emphasis here is process, those institutions and processes designed to ensure the happiness of society as a whole not triumphing on individual liberty. These two ways of viewing democracy has led to the emergence of three models of democracy. The first is a system of decision-making about public affairs in which citizen are directly involved. This is the original form that democracy took in the Greek city-state of Athens and is referred to as direct democracy. Direct democracy is indeed the foundation of republican government. Citizen participation is underlined by a commitment to the principle of civic virtue. The second model is the liberal or representative democracy. This model is hinged on the fact that private property suggests the need authority in the form of a state that monopolizes the means of coercion,, the need for a sovereign power to secure the basis of trade, commerce, religion and the prosperity of the family. Representative democracy was therefore the institutional structure that is devised to protect individual liberty and at the same time ensure the general welfare. The third model is the one party or Marxist democracy. This model takes off from the view that the ideals of liberty, equality and justice that produce the liberation tradition could not be realized by free struggle for votes in the political systems together with the free struggle for profit in the market place (Babatunde, 2015).

Democracy now enjoys worldwide popularity as a key element of good governance and of promoting sustainable human development. In fact, the benefit of good governance, economic prosperity, are said to generate pressures for democratization in newly industrialized countries. Indeed, the more means people acquire, the more likely they are to want a say in making the rules under domain of political freedom. Thus, democracy is the road to good governance, while the achievement of good governance and its attendant economic prosperity is a bulwark for democracy (Babatunde, 2015).

Civil-Military Relations in a Democracy

Democracies function through deliberate processes of delegation, representation, and accountability. The general public delegates a prescribed measure of decision-making authority to elected representatives and then holds those representatives accountable in subsequent elections. The public therefore serves as the principal, electing representatives to serve as its agents to provide sound governance. These elected representatives, in turn, delegate a portion of their vested authority to other groups to accomplish specific subtasks - to wit, the military is the delegated authority to provide national security. In this second-order delegation, the elected government serves as the principal, and the military acts as the agent. This two-tiered delegation between the public, the elected government, and the military creates boundaries of action and accountability for each group. The elected government, accountable to the public at the polls, bears responsibility for crafting policy and making judgments on the use of force in the national interest (Donnithorne, 2013).

The military, accountable to its civilian leaders, bears responsibility for offering sound military advice, assessing risks, and executing the policy—to include using force and risking lives when directed to do so. The distinctions between these roles and responsibilities carry moral significance. Feaver cited in (Donnithorne, 2013), suggests that, “the military can describe in some detail the nature of the threat posed by a particular enemy, but only the civilian can decide whether to feel threatened and, if so, how or even whether to respond. The military assesses the risk, the civilian judges it.” To be sure, the military may disagree strongly with a chosen course of action, even offering sound political wisdom for its contrary counsel (Donnithorne, 2013).

The Military Establishment/Organisation

The military is one of the institutions of the state assigned with the responsibility of defending the territorial integrity of the state to ward-off aggression from other independent state. The emergence of the centralized nation-state provided a primary *raison d'être* for a standing army. Military organization comprises policies that define the mission, roles, and structure of the military—decisions about acquisitions, logistics, training, and equipment, as well as personnel management and military promotions (Croissant, Kuehn & Lorenz, 2012). Military organization like other institutions of the state is the instrument through which the states further their goals and objectives. There are basic features that are peculiar to the military which distinguishes it from others. The military being a positive instrument and coming into existence by order or decree and with the sole aim of fighting to win wars has certain peculiar organizational characteristics. Their features are: (1) centralized command (2) hierarchy (3) discipline (4) internal communication and (5) esprit de corps with a corresponding isolation and selfsufficiency.18 Organization is central to effective performance of the military function (Ojo, 2014).

The military profession exists to serve the state. Military force is a hierarchy of obedience. Each level within must be able to have loyal and instantaneous obedience of subordinate levels. Without these relationships, the military professionalism is impossible. Obedience is the military virtue upon which all other virtues exist (Huntington, 1957, p.73). "A professional officer is imbued with the ideal of service to the nation" (Huntington, 1957, p.35; Arjana, 2002). While the military needs a certain degree of autonomy in order to fulfil its mission, civilian control requires that civilians be able to define its range and boundaries. The ultimate indicator of civilian control in this arena is the extent to which civilians can define and enforce the limits of military regulation of its internal affairs, and who has the ultimate say when it comes to conflict between civilians and officers (Croissant, Kuehn & Lorenz, 2012)

Theoretical Framework

Our discourse is anchored on the Agency theory of civil-military relations propounded in the 1970s, by a number of scholars which include; Mitnick (1973), Jensen & Meckling (1976) among others. Feaver (2003), in his book “Armed servants” adopted and modified the agency theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with civilian authority monitoring the actions of military agents, the armed servants of the nation state. At the heart of the theory is the idea that, civil-military relations are basically a form of strategic interactions between civilian masters (principals) and their military servants (agents). The major assumptions of the theory are;

1. The military will shirk as long as they are not monitored by the polity (principal)
2. The military will work better when the aims of the military and civilians converge
3. The military will work despite not being monitored if they think they will be punished if they get caught shirking (Feaver, 2003).

The relevance of Agency Theory to the study

All over the world, there have always been relationships between civilian leadership and the organization established to protect her, the military. Leaders and followers are bound to relate and interact in one way or the other, in meeting the needs of society. The need to meet the security need of a community, society, nation or country necessitated the formation of the military to defend the country against external attack. Like in every organization where the relationships between the principal or owner and the workers are expected to be cordial, the relationships between the civilian authority and the military are also expected to be cordial, if there must be peace in the society.

The new role of the military in contemporary Nigeria has also resulted in their civilian authority providing some welfare packages in the form of motivation to perform up to expectation. Consequently, the military who now have more responsibilities like maintaining internal security in a democratic society like Nigeria need to relate with their civilian authority or principal as the case may be.

An investigation into the emergence of the Nigerian Armed Forces particularly the Nigeria Army from pre-colonial era to colonial era reveal a Military that bore the vestiges of authoritarianism, forcefulness and oppression designed then to achieve the objectives of the colonial masters. This view of the Military has unfortunately crept into modern-day Nigeria and has remained intact despite being in a democracy. The current perception of the military by civilians as agents of the state wielding so much power and force has remained a constant; with the sight of troops moving around civil spaces creating anxiety (amongst the public) (Olofin, 2019).

Civilian Control of the Military and Civil-Military Relations in Nigeria

The contention that the military should be subordinated to civil authority is predicated on the premise that the military is an arm of the state and an important tool of state policy. Hence, it is to serve as an instrument of political” authorities which has the constitutional right to determine its use. Civilian control of the military is achieved in several ways; in the first instance, the military is kept out of politics and thus subordinated to civilian leaders who are accountable to the people directly or through an assembly. Secondly, while the military is required to provide input in form of advice and as well implement defence

policy, the formulation of policy in the realm of defence is to be the sole responsibility of the civilian authority. Thirdly; there exists strict political neutrality within the military as a means of ensuring its loyalty to the government of the day, irrespective of the political party that constitutes the government. The subjective or penetration control employs the systematic and thorough-going politicization which has been achieved in varying degree in dictatorial or one-party state. For example Hitler attempted in 1934 to turn the German Army into “political soldier”. Under the institutional penetration control, civilian control of the military is maintained through a level of interpenetration between the armed forces and the party (Babatunde, 2015).

The institutions of the state such as the executive, legislature and judiciary are expected to provide the military with the legislation, policies, resources, and oversight support necessary to sustain a professional force. The military, in turn, is expected to be able and willing to protect the citizens and institutions of the state against external and internal threats. This implies that the military is the servant of society, which exercises monopoly over the use of arms to protect the citizens and state. The civil society on the other hand works independently, but in most cases in collaboration with national and international institutions, to ensure that the military discharge its tasks in responsible, professional and accountable manner. In addition, the civil society will provide the military with information and other supports to attain the objectives of national security, these interactions permeate all spheres of the polity (Onuoha & Okafor, 2019).

Until 1999, the Nigerian military was immersed in regional ethnic, institutional and constitutional politics. Specific efforts are being made to professionalize the military, re-indoctrinate it on values of subordination to civilian rules in order to improve its capacity and give it a national apolitical outlook (Babatunde, 2015). The 1999 constitution states in section 217(2c) that one of the fundamental objectives of the armed forces of Nigeria is “suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an act of the Nation Assembly”. Section 218(1) similarly underscores the president's supreme and constitutional power over the military: “The powers of the president as the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the federation shall include bower tip determine the operation use of the Armed Forces of the federation. Against the background of these constitutional powers and as a device for clearing up the mess that had been perpetrated by the past military regimes, that former president Olusegun Obasanjo invoked two fundamental measures: one, he retired all military officer that had held political appointments in the country between 1984 and 1999; two, he brought to trial some top military officers (Babatunde, 2015).

The rationale for purging the erstwhile political military officers was promised on the perception that all officers that served previous military regimes in various political positions might not be fully amenable to life in the barracks any longer, and could therefore disturb the efforts at re-professionalizing the military under civilian political leadership. These appeared to be bold attempts to institutionalize civilian control of the military and re-professionalize, the armed forces they are insufficient to checkmate future military intervention in the nation's body polity. It is only good and transparent people-oriented governance that can constitute the major antidote to military incursion into politics (Babatunde, 2015).

The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is very clear on the hierarchy of military establishment. Chapter VI, Part I (a), Section 130 (2) of the Nigerian constitution (1999) affirms that the President shall be the Head of State, the Chief Executive of the Federation and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces of the Federation. The constitution of Nigeria provided for the subordination of the military to civilian authority (Ayeni, et al., 2019). Whosoever emerges as Nigerian President is the

Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces, of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This constitutional provision makes the civilian President or any of his representatives to be superior to the military. The Nigerian constitution has already provided a good framework for the role of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (the military) in democracy. According to the 1999 Constitution, as amended, Nigeria is committed to maintaining a strong military for the purpose of defending Nigeria from external aggression; maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air; suppressing insurrection; and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly (NASS) (Onuoha & Okafor, 2019).

In order to promote democratic stability and overall national security, the military is expected to be accountable to the rule of law, subordinates itself to civil authority, assist in articulating and implementing the national security strategy or defence policy, respect human rights principles and practices, and provide strategic advice to the political leadership. Other roles include, maintain high-level professionalism in discharge of assigned tasks, provide assistance to civilian authority in times of emergency, and assist the police and other agencies to maintain law and order (Onuoha & Okafor, 2019).

In Nigeria, concerted efforts by successive administrations to professionalise the military and put issues of civil military relations on the front burner gradually became a norm. Efforts are being made to professionalise the military, re-indoctrinate it and give it a national apolitical outlook (Babatunde 2015: 4) (Abdullahi & Olofin, 2019). In Nigeria's Fourth Republic, the challenges of consolidating democracy, as it relates to civil-military relations, are not the result of the threat by the nation's armed forces to retake control of the country's polity. Rather, the challenges to reforming civil-military relations in the post-military period are a direct result of the continued privileges and prerogatives that the military has maintained following the transition to democracy; the continued military impunity for human rights violation; the perpetuation of secrecy around military activities; and the insulation of military and security issues from the public (Adhima, 2016).

5. Various Security Challenges faced in Nigeria

5.1 Fulani Herdsmen and Farmers Conflict

In the Middle-belt of North Central Zone, insecurity is rife. In Plateau State particularly, conflict between the Hausa-Fulani and the Birom people has left hundreds of people dead while in Benue State, Governor Samuel Ortom has had a hectic time with the conflict between the Fulani herdsmen and the local people, thereby leading to many deaths and the sacking of several villages. This dreadful clash presumed to be predicated by unresolved land dispute, climate change, religious and ethnic sectarianism and lack understanding have resulted in killing, internal displacement, food insecurity and extensive damage to people's properties and livestock within the affected communities, and have metamorphosed into industrial scale occurrence of civil unrest, riots, mass killing, destruction of homes believed to be driven by religious and ethnic differences.

5.2 Terrorism/Religious Extremism

The North-East Zone of Nigeria has also had its fair share of security challenges, particularly as it has housed the dreaded Boko Haram. Of these national security challenges, probably the most perturbing is the insurgency in the North East driven by the Islamist terrorist group, Boko Haram. The Boko Haram

conflict has been raging since the public execution of the group's popular leader, Mohammed Yusuf, by police forces in Maiduguri. Led by Abubakar Shekau, in 2012, the Boko Haram began a campaign of violence since which, according to Kashim Shettima, the then Governor of Borno state, as many as 100,000 people have lost their lives and two million people have been displaced. The conflict has had a devastating impact on the regional economy, too.

5.3 Ethno-Religious Crises

Ethno-religious clashes have proved to be the most violent instances of inter-group crisis in Nigeria. They have occurred mainly in the Middle-Belt and cultural borderline states of the Muslim north, where Muslim Hausa-Fulani groups have been pitted against non-Muslim ethnic groups in a “dangerous convergence of religious and ethnic fears and animosities in which it is often difficult to differentiate between religious and ethnic conflicts as the dividing line between the two is very thin” (International IDEA 2000: 296; Osaghae & Suberu, 2005). The major examples of violent ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria have included the Kafanchan-Kaduna crises in 1987 and 1999, Zangon-Kataf riots of 1992, Tafawa Balewa clashes in 1991, 1995 and 2000, the Kaduna Sharia riots of 2000, and the Jos riots of 2001.

5.4 Niger Delta's Militancy

The Niger Delta region which is the source of Nigeria's wealth, regrettably suffers from a paradox of poverty in the midst plenty. The agitation and disenchantment of the marginalized youths led to the emergence of various militant groups that were involved in not just kidnapping but bombing of oil installations. As Nwagboso (2012) observed, the inability or failure of the government, particularly during the military era, to address the root causes of the agitation (environmental problems, poverty, unemployment, lack of basic amenities, etc.), in the Niger Delta region, resulted in the spawning of ethnic militias of Niger Delta origin leading to the militarisation of nearly the entire region. These resulted to security crisis which the Federal government have battled to bring under control.

5.5 Secessionist Movement

Avalanche of Separatists movements surfaced and picked up steam immediately Buhari came to power. However, worthy of note is the pro- Biafran movement under the umbrella of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) led by self acclaimed director Nnamdi Kanu. The secessionist actions of the IPOB could be said to afflict National unity with hefty threats this time, the battle is against the supporters of Biafran sovereignty. These agitations have led to security crisis in the south-east and its resurgence is attributable to the perceived marginalization and lopsided development embarked upon by the President Buhari's administration.

5.6 Kidnapping/Abduction

Kidnapping, which is the act of abducting somebody and keeping him/her as a prisoner in order to get a ransom for his/her release, suddenly took on a whole new economic attraction in the South-East geopolitical zone before spreading to the Southwest and finally to the Northern part of Nigeria where it is currently ravaging the country with apparently no end in sight. Kidnappers went as far as abducting

school children, traditional rulers, innocent citizens while attending church services or village meetings, while travelling along the highways, and some even right inside their homes. A lot of kidnappings in Nigeria go unreported. Reasons for this include mistrust of law enforcers and a penal system believed by many ordinary citizens to be deeply flawed.

5.7 *Banditry in the Northern part of Nigeria*

The prevalence of big forests that extend across the states of the Northwest zone has facilitated the perpetration of violent acts and rural banditry by criminal gangs who use the expansive and dense forests to terrorise human settlements in the rural areas and the commuters on the highways. The bandits, mostly operating in gangs engaged in serial killings, kidnappings, robberies, rape, cattle-rustling and other forms of terrorism in states like Zamfara, Kano, Kaduna, Katsina and recently Sokoto, with devastating consequences for the rural population.

6. Challenges of Civil-Military Leadership in addressing the Security Challenges in Nigeria

6.1 *Weak Parliamentary Oversight of the Military*

Parliamentary oversight refers to the responsibilities of the National Assembly to supervise, using its law making powers over governmental bodies, to promote compliance with the law within the framework of good governance (Aluko, 2015, p.181). The National Assembly as an institution is central to the democratization process and in bringing the military under civilian control. By virtue of the roles vested on it through the 1999 constitution Section 218, the National Assembly commands the influence to bring the military under civilian control through strong and effective oversight functions on the military. The 1999 constitution adopted at the beginning of the Fourth Republic provides the National Assembly with a broad range of functions and authorities from which Nigeria's legislative branch may exercise oversight of the armed forces. Specifically, Part I of the second schedule states that the National Assembly can legislate on the following military matters: (1) arms, ammunition, and explosives procurement; (2) defense; (3) military (Army, Navy, and Air Force) including any other branch of the armed forces; and (4) any matter incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned elsewhere in this list. This section, Ukase (2014) suggests, ties the very existence of the armed forces to the National Assembly. This is primarily because the National Assembly, through the power vested in it by the constitution, may choose to legislate for the mere existence—or not—of the armed forces, depending on how it deems fit. Moreover, by way of legislation, the National Assembly can also control the capability of the armed forces because it is the legislature which determines the appropriation of resources for the Nigerian armed forces (Adhima, 2016). The legislature's responsibility to approve the national budget highlights the power the constitution vests in the National Assembly allowing the legislature to exercise oversight of the armed forces.

Despite the broad range of powers and functions vested in it by the constitution, the Nigerian parliament's attempt at institutionalizing control and exercising oversight of the armed forces in the Fourth Republic has been anaemic at best. One of the primary factors contributing to this was the state of the legislature at the beginning of the Fourth Republic. Following the country's return to Civil Rule, legislators were ill-prepared to take on their role in the first National Assembly. The long military interregnum coupled with the hurried pace of transition to the Fourth Republic created a formidable institutional deficit in parliament (Lewis 2009). Most legislators elected to the first National Assembly were political neophytes

who had little or no political experience. The compressed schedule of party registration, nomination, and political recruitment left political parties with limited filters for attracting qualified candidates and little time to formulate a comprehensive policy to help guide legislative agenda. Furthermore, the first National Assembly inherited a precarious state of public finance with limited funds to equip and staff the legislature which forced members to operate with a skeletal staff and few documents, computers, and library resources (Lewis 2009; Adhima, 2016).

6.2 Tension between the Military and Civil Society

Despite modest success recorded by the military in the ongoing counter insurgency operations such as reclaiming of territory previously held by the insurgents and the free of hostages, its kinetic approach has often posed serious challenges to protection of civilians. In particular, tensions have erupted between the military and civil society primarily over issues bordering on civilian harm more broadly and human rights violations more specifically. Data in the table below though not exhaustive, they represent some instances of tension between the military and the civil society (Onuoha & Okafor, 2019).

Table 1: Some Cases of Tension between the Military and Civil Society in the North East

S/No	Date	Location	Incident	Remarks
1.	6 January 2019	Maiduguri	Unlawful invasion of Daily Trust Newspaper office and arrest of its staff: UthmanAbubakar and Ibrahim Sawab	The Army accused the newspaper of divulging “classified military information, thus undermining national security”
2.	15 August 2016	Maiduguri	Army’s declaration of Ahmad Salkida wanted for obtaining the video of the April 14 th kidnapping of Chibok girls	The journalist is known to have access to Boko Haram. He was later arrested by the DSS on 5 September 2016
3.	13 April 2018	Giwa barracks in Maiduguri, Borno State	The Detention of an estimated 4,900 people in extremely over crowded cells	Some children were alleged to have been unlawful detained along with their parents
4.	16 February 2015	Hausari, Maiduguri, Borno State	Clash between the military and the CJTF over insistence by the latter on inspecting the ammunition-laden trucks of the military	5 members of the CJTF were allegedly killed by the military in the clash
5.	21 February, 2015	Jimeta Shopping Complex, Yola, Adamawa State	The clash between an Army officer and CJTF member	People were forced to vacate the place for fear of being killed in the process
6.	9 March 2014	Maiduguri, Borno State	Clash between the military and the CJTF over refusal to stop questioning 5 plain cloth soldiers who they were told to allow by the military	The confrontation led to the death of one CJTF

Source: Authors' compilation

6.3 Weak Communication between the Military and the Civil Populace

Clearly, the subtle feeling of the Military being out of the control of the Principal is still present in the populace. There is a near absence of a mutual relationship between civilians and the Armed Forces. This challenge has been highlighted as having its roots in the long years of military ruler-ship as the military still find it difficult in subordinating itself entirely to civilian authority (Ukase, 2014, p.10). Evidently missing is the trust and cooperation that should form the basis of a good civil military relations in Nigeria. The Military is a highly regarded and respected institution in Nigeria owing largely to its very strict training and disciplinary system and the role it plays in fighting off the external enemy to paying the ultimate sacrifice. Yet again, open communication between civilians and the military remains challenging in Nigeria (Olofin, 2019).

6.4 Civil Military Relations Desks in the Military Remain Highly Centralized

Nigeria's security institutions are overtly concentrated at the headquarters mostly at the Federal Capital Territory-Abuja. A common practice militating against effective civil military relations especially at the state-level is the need for instructions from the Headquarters and the blurred presence of civil military units/desks for engagement with communities. In fairness to the hierarchical structure of the security agencies including the military, critical civil society interventions on civil military relations continue to be less effective at the state levels (Olofin, 2019).

6.5 Human Right Abuse by the Military

Despite the gains made by the Military at fostering civil military relations, the recurrent deployment of the Military across civil spaces has human rights implications. This occurs when deployed personnel have not been adequately trained on the principles of civil military relations. Nagarajan (2017) has identified three key dimensions of civilian harm caused by the actions or inactions of the military in the North East. These actions have implications for CMR in the region. First is the failure to protect vulnerable and at-risk communities from insurgent attacks. Some soldiers are known to have fled from communities when they hear that insurgents are approaching, leaving the civilians in the area to fend for themselves. The second is the failure to prevent collateral damage during military operations, thereby causing direct and indirect harm. The third, and most disturbing, is allegations of human rights violations by soldiers deployed to protect the citizens. Such infractions include unlawful detention, harassment, the destruction of property, sexual violence, torture, and excessive use of force, among others. For instance, the Amnesty International (2015a) alleged that between 2009 and 2015, Nigerian military forces arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000, including children as young as nine (Onuoha & Okafor, 2019).

Human rights violations by the military and CJTF was a contributory factor in the rise the Knifar women's movement in the North East. The Movement is a group of displaced women, representing more than 1200 men, women and children in military run detention centres, who are campaigning for justice (Soniya, 2017). Like the military, the CJTF has been accused of gradually becoming a law unto itself, perpetrating vices like rape, armed robbery, stealing, killings and harassment of innocent people. In addition, the actions of their members have occasionally caused tension in their relations with the military (Onuoha & Okafor, 2019).

6.6 *Intimidation, Harassment, and Physical Assault by Security Forces:*

Civilians reported they were regularly intimidated, physically assaulted, extorted, and had their property stolen or seized by security forces. They also complained about the frequency with which security forces were careless with their weapons, often shooting indiscriminately and sporadically into the air. Civilians described unprovoked physical assaults of young men who security forces believed might have been sympathizers or members of insurgent, banditry, kidnapping and separatist groups and civilians returning from their farms or collecting firewood were accused of conspiring with armed groups and subjected to harsh interrogation, threats, and physical violence. The military was also responsible for checkpoints on roads connecting area towns, and at these checkpoints or while on patrol they would demand civilians pay bribes before they could pass through. Within the garrison towns the military and community militias supporting security efforts would sometimes abuse their position for personal gain. When food items were distributed to people who are in the internally displaced people's camp, it was sometimes seized by military. In some cases, you will see personnel of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) pursue a truck carrying food stuff, and when they catch up with them, they will use their knife to tear open the bag and forcefully take the food they want. And no one can challenge them (CIVIC, 2020).

Soldiers reportedly extort citizens after intimidating them. It is now a norm for soldiers to ask defaulting car drivers on the high way to do 'frog jumps' as a form of punishment. Women and girls are raped on a number of occasions whether or not during a conflict. Some girls were reportedly raped in Abuja by soldiers under the guise that the girls were prostitutes (CKN Nigeria, 2013; Phinos, & Ogbu, 2019). Given the abusive practices, civilians resented and feared security forces. Civilians said they had few avenues for seeking justice for the wrongs they suffered. Some reported to the police while others appealed to the traditional leaders, but with few results. In many areas the appropriate mechanism for reporting violations and abuses simply did not function any longer, with local governance left to the military because local officials had fled before the area was secured. Without reliable options, many civilians simply adopted a culture of silence because they could not talk about these problems in public. Those who attempted to report an abuse were sometimes beaten by the civilian security forces operating alongside the military. Civilians were scared of the military and CJTF and felt powerless. One man said, “due to ignorance and illiteracy we did not know what to do and how to report” (CIVIC, 2020).

6.7 *Lack of accountability*

Military procurement and expenditure are critical areas that have remained opaque to civilians that continue to be contentious topics in civil military forums held in the project. Military leaders and personnel will rather not discuss this at the various fora and continue to make strong cases for classifying procurement related discussions and military expenditure as issues of national security that should not be subject to public scrutiny (Olofin, 2019). In Nigeria, the lack of decisive civilian leadership in the MoD, or rather the lack of political will of the government to engage in defense matters, has led the military to take on various projects independently without any oversight from civilian leadership. Such actions not only hinder the prospect for civilian control in the MoD, but they also adversely affect the military itself.

The MoD has failed to institutionalize civilian control in the Fourth Republic. Instead, the military continues to perform many of the roles of the MoD with little interaction or supervision from the civilians inside the ministry. Perhaps, one of the greatest challenges to institutionalizing civilian control in the MoD starts with the position of the Defense Minister itself. In general, the concept of institutionalizing

civilian control of the MoD relies on the idea of a civilian Defense Minister who clearly oversees both the military and civilian arms of the ministry (Irikefe 2014; cited in Adhima, 2016).

6.8 *Arbitrary Arrest and Extra judicial killings*

Military in internal security operations have been accused of extra judicial killings. The Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima, said in April 2013 that over 100 people were killed in Baga during a clash between officers of the Joint Task Force and insurgents over the weekend. Residents of the village said they buried 185 people after the battle, while the Red Cross has said 187 people were killed (Human Right Watch, 2015). The human Rights Watch also reported that during a military operation which began on October 22, 2001, soldiers from the 23rd Amored Brigade of the 3rd Armoured Division rounded up villagers at Gbeji (in Zaki Biam area of Benue State) in what turned out to be a “ploy” meeting. The soldiers made the villagers to sit on the ground, separating thereby men from the rest and opening fire on the men indiscriminately (Phinos, & Ogbu, 2019).

Soldiers involved in internal security operations also effect arrest arbitrarily. For instance, at Odi and ZakiBiam, many young people were arrested and falsely accused of being masterminds of the killing of security personnel. At Onitsha, a number of youths were arrested and falsely accused of being members of MASSOB (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). Even before the proscription of IPOB, there have been cases of illegal arrest and extra-judicially killing of their members who in most cases are unarmed.

6.9 *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*

Civilians claimed the military, CJTF and other militias, and police regularly engaged in practices of sexual exploitation and abuse. Rape by security forces are common occurrences. A report published by CIVIC, (2020) noted that one of the respondents described her community's horrific experience: “Women were forcefully taken away, raped, and impregnated, and there was nothing we could do.” Other respondents confirmed that security forces would enter civilian homes, remove the women and subsequently abuse them. Respondents also noted that security forces were frequent patrons of women who had resorted to prostitution as a coping strategy once other economic opportunities were no longer available (CIVIC, 2020).

6.10 *Lack of Effective and Proactive Political Leadership*

A major factor in the military's ailment has been the lack of effective political leadership. While the constitution makes the president commander-in-chief, some of the Nigerian leaders since the inception of the current democratic dispensation never rose to that responsibility. This was partly due to their lack of familiarity with the military, but also because they did not regularly convene meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) or the National Defence Council (NDC), from which they would have drawn much-needed advice and support. The National Assembly (federal parliament) has also not been an effective steward of national security. In the years immediately after return to democratic rule, most legislators were largely ignorant of their basic law-making, appropriation and oversight duties. Capacity developed gradually and is still very limited. Poor oversight allowed rot in the armed forces to deepen. For instance, parliament never knew it was constitutionally mandated to scrutinise security chief nominees before confirmation until a court awakened it to the responsibility in 2013.

Nigerian leadership, since the period of independence (in 1960) up to the present, have constantly allocated the lion share of the overall federal budget to the defence sector. The greater share to the defence sector is premised on the fact that the armed forces are the overall protectors of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Nigerian nation, which includes the protection of the totality of the states' economic, political and socio-cultural interests. Failure to track how appropriated funds were used by military chiefs also contributed to the environment of corruption and abuse. Unsatisfactory political leadership was further compounded by defence ministry lethargy and instability.

The various security operatives and institutions in Nigeria have also conspired to worsening the insecurity problem in Nigeria. The Nigerian security agencies have been accused overtime to be conspiring with the criminal elements with a view to worsening the insecurity problem currently bedevilling the country so as to make pecuniary gains. For instance, the Nigerian Army has been accused of providing intelligence security report to the insurgents and bandits in order to aid their activities and also, the police force is not spare out as they have also been accused of conspiring with the members of the sect to frustrate and truncate democratic practices in the country (Igbokwu & Orhero, 2014).

6.11 Civil-Military Relations and Corruption in Nigeria

The Corruption Perception Index for 2019 which was released in January 2020 showed that Nigeria is the 146 least corrupt nations out of 180 countries and scored 26 points out of 100. According to Badmus (2017) corruption is a major cause of several socio-economic and political misfortunes that has be fallen Nigeria since the first republic. It has destroyed Nigeria's values system and has engendered most if not all of the security challenges being faced by the country (Adeosun, 2021).

During the several decades of military rule in Nigeria, the Nigerian armed forces lost nearly all semblance of a professional force and became thoroughly corrupt. As a result, the military is incapable of promoting self-reforms and this has negatively impacted the process of democratization (Ainabor, et al., 2010). Travelling within the country has become so perilous that it is now advisable to get a 'security report' of all towns and villages on our way before setting out. It is appalling to find authorities within the government and MoD living like millionaires while members of the security forces are said to be using less sophisticated weapons and armoury than that used by insurgents and bandits. We cannot be talking about addressing the insecurity challenges facing us as a nation when those in Government and Security authorities cannot transparently account to Nigerians, how and what the huge budgets meant for the Defence Ministry are used.

Looking at the billions of Naira and dollars that are yearly budgeted and expended on defence-related expenditures in Nigeria, one would observe that these huge budgets do not justify the outputs on the ground. There have been so many complaints regarding the poorly-equipped status of the Nigerian military, which has contributed to its struggle and difficulty in curtailing the insecurity situation in the country. One is then left to wonder what the yearly huge budgets for the Nigerian Defence are used for, especially when not much is achieved or known about how these budgets are expended.

Allocation to the key government ministries and agencies under security and defence got the lion's share of the 2012 budget when compared to 2011 and 2010 shows that from 2010 through to 2012, Nigeria would just spent around \$84 billion, of which \$16 billion would be for security. The table below shows the Security Votes in Nigeria between 2009 and 2015 in US Dollars:

Table 6.2 Amount Allocated to the Military in the Budget 2009-2015

2009	224,021,000,000
2010	299,108,000,000
2011	369,045,000,000
2012	364,843,000,000
2013	380,500,000,000
2014	373,815,000,000
2015	397,497,000,000

From the foregoing, one can see why senior security officers and their civilian counterpart including factions of the political elite who has no conscience and thought for the thousands that have been killed and are being killed every day as a result of the insecurity challenges facing the country had to divert the funds meant to address the insecurity challenges. Most of combat instruments purchased were archaic, and some of the more powerful combat weapons were traded with the insurgents for more profit, while the larger crisis persists and more money was continuously doled out to the military to ensure the security of lives and property. Indeed this became a lucrative venture for corrupt military officers and their civilian counterpart.

Deficiencies in the way the military budget and arms purchases are decided and controlled have only succeeded in creating higher levels of inefficient military expenditure and inappropriate weapons purchases. Excessive military spending and arms imports flowing from weak budgetary and procurement processes have failed to provide economic or security benefits, merely consuming scarce resources needed to address basic needs of the population. Lack of transparency in particular creates high vulnerability for corruption, especially in arms procurement processes. In Nigeria many countries, the military tends to be one of the most corrupt sectors of government because of the level of 'secrecy' often observed by the players in this sector.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

The inability of the military to address the rising insecurity in Nigeria is as a result of the emergence of a weak political leadership (with most of them having military background) that is enmeshed in corruption, nepotism, ethnic politics and religious fundamentalism, manifested in military corruption, untrained or ill-equipped military that lacks the courage to checkmate the security challenges bedeviling the country. It needs to be emphasised that the military is critical to the sustenance of democracy; accordingly, it must be a willing partner collaborating with civil authorities within the framework of the rule of law, transparency and accountability and display the highest level of professional conduct in its primary role to protect the people and the state. Current practices in Nigeria still portend a weak linkage between civilians and the military and the need for greater accountability by the military. Oversight from the parliament over the military is still shadowy while military business remains largely vague with many complexities.

Deriving from the above, we recommend the emergence of a strong civil-political leadership that is transparent and accountable to the Nigerian people and has the courage to direct the military on the most appropriate measures to take in order to address the rising security challenges in Nigeria. Also, inter-agency rivalry and superiority has long deprived the entire security architecture of Nigeria the much-

needed intelligence to share information and nip potential conflicts in the bud. The security challenges springing up in virtually all parts of the country requires a coordinated approach involving cooperation and collaboration from both civilian and military leadership in addressing such crisis. The military, in the course of carrying out their duty is encouraged to adhere strictly to the constitution, professionalism and rules of engagement and finally the military must allow itself to be subordinated to effective civilian control in order to cure her of some of her excesses.

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